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This is a comparative study of the advantages and
disadvantages of Hong Kong, Tokyo and Singapore as an
international banking centre. The materials included in
the present study are mainly collected through
literature research and interviews with experienced
bankers. Various aspects of the three cities including
the banking systems, political environments, economic
environments, regulatory frameworks, infrastructures
and competitive environments have been compared in this
study.
The banking systems of the three cities are very
different from each other. While Hong Kong and
Singapore's banking systems are characterized by
dividing the banks into three classes with the higher
class banks performing more functions than the lower
class banks, Japan's banking system is structured in
such a way that different banking functions are
performed by different kind of banks.
Japan and Singapore have relatively stable
political environments as compared to that of Hong
Kong. Economically, Japan has a gross national product
which is very much larger than those of Singapore and
Hong Kong. However, Hong Kong's economic growth rate
2is the most optimistic among the three.
Japan is now experiencing a deregulation process
which favours the further development of Tokyo to be an
international banking centre. In contrast, Hong Kong
is tightening its banking laws and Singapore still
maintains a tight control on the banking system.
Each of the three cities has an efficient
communications system which is conducive to the growth
towards an international banking centre. Rentals,
wages and tax rates are relatively high in Tokyo,
followed by Singapore and then Hong Kong. The scarcity
of human resources with a workable standard of English
poses a problem for Tokyo.
Many foreign banks suffer from heavy losses in
Japan and Singapore and this may upset their status as
international banking centres.
The final conclusion is that Tokyo will become the
leader of the three cities in terms of banking
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Few people will disagree that Hong Kong, Tokyo and
Singapore are the three major financial centres in
Asia. Since Hong Kong, Tokyo and Singapore are quite
unique to each other, it would be useful to know what
makes these three places successful in being
international banking centres. The authors would also
want to see whether Hong Kong will remain a major
banking centre in Asia under the increasing competitive
threats from Tokyo and Singapore. It is thought that
the present topic can provide us with a better
understanding of the above questions.
1.2 Statement of the Problem and Research Objectives
The major research problem to be assessed is
stated as follows:
Will Hong Kong survive as a major banking centre
in Asia in spite of increased competition from Tokyo
and Singapore?
The specific research objectives of the study are:
10 To produce a clear picture of the banking
systems of the three cities.
2. To compare the advantages and disadvantages
of the three cities as international banking
centres.
3. To predict the future development of the
three cities as international banking centres.
1.3 Operational Definitions
Definition of a BanKing centre
A banking centre is a locality with a network of
established banking institutions and efficient markets
providing a wide range of banking services. Banking
institutions are the ones that are defined by the laws
of the three cities respectively.
1.4 Scope of Study
Instead of comparing the three cities a5 1111x111-.LG1-L
centres, which may involve a great variety of financial
activities, the authors narrow down the topic to the
comparison of the three cities as banking centres.
Stock markets, bond markets, commodity futures markets
and financial futures markets are not included in the
current study. In addition, the authors will not touch
on the area of insurance companies and their role in
the financial markets.
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1.5 Framework of the Report
In what follows, the methodology and limitations
of the research will be described. Then the banking
systems of the three places will be discussed. After
that, the political, economic and regulatory
environments of the three cities will be described and
compared. Next, the infrastructural and physical
attributes will be evaluated. The competitive
environments of the three cities' banking industry will
then be mentioned. Finally, some predictions will be





As the research is exploratory or fact finding in
nature, a literature review is carried out to increase
the researchers' understanding of the research problem.
Relevant books and other literature on the present
topic have been reviewed. In addition, various
information concerning Hong Kong, Tokyo and Singapore
is gathered from newspapers, journals, magazines and
periodicals.
2.2 Personal Interviews
Primary data is collected through personal
interviews with local and foreign bankers who are
familiar with the research topic.
After reviewing the relevant literature, the
researchers have a better understanding of the research
problem. At that point, a plan of interrogation
containing questions which focus on the crux of the
research problem will be developed. In-depth personal
interviews are then arranged. The interviews are semi-
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structured to allow flexibility for the bankers to
express their views freely.
After all interviews have been conducted, the
interviews' contents will be compared to see if there
exists any relationship or correlation among them. The
results will then be summarized. Together with the
secondary data collected, it is hoped that a meaningful
conclusion can be drawn.
2.3 Limitations
First of all, the authors encountered some
difficulties in obtaining a clear-cut definition of the
activities of a banking centre. This is because the
banking systems in the three cities under study are
quite different from each other and they have different
ways of classifying banks. To make matters worse, the
three cities are quite unique in terms of several
aspects which may sometimes make comparison irrelevant.
One example is the number of banks registered in the
three places. While it is easy to find out the number
of banks in Hong Kong and Singapore, it is not easy to
use this measure on Tokyo since most statistics will
just give the number of banks in Japan, instead of in
the city of Tokyo.
Secondly, the authors also find obstacles during
the literature review. While secondary data concerning
Hong Kong is easy to collect, data for Singapore and
6
Japan (or Tokyo) are quite difficult to find and some
of them are outdated. As a result, the authors find
that some comparisons are not possible.
CHAPTER III
A BRIEF REVIEW OF
HONG KONG'S BANKING SYSTEM
Hong Kong has developed rapidly from a
manufacturing-oriented economy to a major financial
centre over the last three decades. The financial
system in Hong Kong consists primarily of the banks and
securities firms. Basically the banks and securities
businesses are separated. Only the banking system will
1-i g, rI Acz- rrihPrl hPrP_
3.1 The Three-Tier System
The banking system in Hong Kong is characterized
by its three-tier structure, which was introduced in
May 1981. It comprises three distinctive classes of
deposit-taking institutions. The terminology of these
three classes of institutions is licensed banks,
licensed deposit-taking companies (licensed DTCs) and
registered deposit-taking companies (registered DTCs).
At the end of 1986 we had 151 licensed banks, 38
licensed DTCs and 252 registered DTCs, making a total
of 441 institutions.
The licensed bank may carry out all forms of
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banking business, including the acceptance of deposits
of any amount or term of repayment (including both
checking and savings accounts). At the other end of
the scale, the registered DTCs are restricted to take
deposits of HK$100,000 or more with an original term to
maturity of at least three months. The licensed DTCs
may take deposits of any maturity in amounts of not
less than HK$500,000. Neither registered nor licensed
DTCs are allowed to operate either checking or savings
accounts, or describe themselves as banks.
Licensed DTCs is a relatively new category of
DTC. The creation of the licensed DTCs came about as
part of the restructuring of the deposit base of the
banking system in Hong Kong, which removed from
registered DTCs their ability to accept deposits
repayable in less than three months.
Most of the DTCs engage in what might be called
merchant banking and, indeed, the merchant banks in
Hong Kong operate with licenses which are issued in
accordance with the regulations of the Deposit-taking
Ordinance 1976. In addition, these DTCs are very often
the subsidiaries of major banks in Hong Kong.
3. 2 Entry Qualifications
Locally incorporated banks are requirea to nave d
minimum paid-up share capital of at least HK$100
million, whereas licensed DTCs are required to have an
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issued share capital of the same amount, but a paid-up
share capital of only HK$75 million. These figures are
relatively large compared to the registered DTCs, which
are only required to have a minimum paid-up capital of
HK$10 million.
There is a real difference in Hong Kong between
the system of licensing and that of registration. The
system of licensing gives absolute discretion to the
licensing authority, whether it be the Governor in
Council in the case of licensed banks, or the Financial
Secretary in the case of licensed DTCs. In either
case, the licensing authority has complete discretion
to refuse to grant a license without giving any reason,
whereas, in the case of registration of companies as
DTCs, there is a different treatment. A company
applying for registration has the right to be
registered under the.law, unless it fails to comply
with the basic requirements for such registration.
In 19 78, after a very long moratorium on the
granting of banking licences, the authority laid down
1
three criteria for the licensing of foreign banks.
Firstly, the bank has to be incorporated in a country
where the monetary authorities can exercise effective
prudential supervision and have no objection to the
The decision taken in 1978 to ease the moratorium
on the licensing of banks was explicitly limited to
foreign banks. In this sense, the term foreign bank
means an bank incorporated outside Hong Kong.
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establishment of a branch of the bank in Hong Kong.
Secondly, the applicant bank must have total assets
(less contra items) in excess of US$14 billion.
Thirdly, that some acceptable form of reciprocity in
the country of incorporation of the applicant bank (or
the state, in the case of the United State of America)
is available to banks incorporated in Hong Kong.
3.3 Prudential Supervision
The Commissioner is the authority in Hong Kong for
the prudential supervision of licensed banks, licensed
DTCs and registered DTCs. He has a title of
Commissioner of Banking. As stated in the Banking
Ordinance 1986, the principal function of the
Commissioner shall be to promote the general stability
and effective working of the banking system. In
2
addition, the Commissioner shall:
(a) be responsible for supervising compliance with the
provisions of the Banking Ordinance 1986
(b) take all reasonable steps to ensure that the
principal places of business, local branches,
overseas branches and overseas representative
offices of all authorized institutions and local
representative offices are operated in a
LFunctions of Commissioner, Hong Kong Banking
Ordinance 1986, (May 1986), p. A154
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responsible, honest and business-like manner
(c) promote and encourage proper standards of conduct
and sound and prudent business practices amongst
authorized institutions
(d) suppress or aid in suppressing illegal,
dishonourable or improper practices in relation to
the business practices of authorized institutions
(e) co-operate with and assist recognized banking
supervisory authorities of any place outside Hong
Kong, whenever appropriate, to the extent
permitted by this or other Ordinance and
(f) consider and propose reforms of the law relating
to the banking business and the business of taking
deposits.
The commissioner's office is supported by teams of
experienced examiners who regularly visit all licensed
banks and DTCs to carry out management examinations.
They will also look at the monthly returns of the banks
and DTCs since these data review the financial
conditions as well as other information on liquid
assets. Such data are analysed and certain ratios are
computed for monitoring purpose. The information is
also used to check compliance with requirements of the
Ordinance concerning restrictions on the holding of
certain classes of assets. The code of behavior for
banks and DTCs in Hong Kong is laid down by the
legislature in the Banking Ordinance 1986, which
provide, inter alia, for minimum levels of capital
12
adequacy and liquidity and maximum levels of holdings
of certain class of assets. In the case of a branch of
a foreign banks, no assessment is made on the adequacy
of capital. The Commissioner relies on the home
authority to ensure that the bank has adequate capital
on a world-wide consolidated basis.
3.4 The Hong Kong Association of Banks
For many years in Hong Kong there was a voluntary
Exchange Banks' Association. It was replaced at the
beginning of 1981 by the Hong Kong Association of
Banks, established by its own Ordinance. Each licensed
banks is now required, by a condition attached to its
ordinance, to become and remain a member of the
Association.
The Association has a committee of 12 members,
consisting of 3 continuing members (the Hongkong and
Shanghai Banking Corporation, Standard Chartered Bank
and Bank of China) and 9 elected members, of whom 4 are
elected by locally-incorporated banks and 5 by banks
incorporated outside Hong Kong. The offices of
Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the committee are held
alternately by The Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation and Standard Chartered Bank. In addition,
there is a Consultative council, which is intended to
form a link between the individual members of the
Association and the committee which runs the
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Association. The Consultative Council consists of the
same 3 continuing members, plus 21 members elected on a
constituency basis: 5 members from Hong Kong, 3 from
the United States of America, 2 from the People's
Republic of China, 2 from the United Kingdom, 2 from
Japan and 1 each from 7 other countries or groups of
countries.
Members of the old Exchange Banks' Association had
entered into an interest rate agreement (which was also
extended to non-member banks) back in 1964. That
agreement was initially taken over by the Hong Kong
Association of Banks. The interest rate agreement
regulates the maximum rate of interest which may be
paid by licensed banks for deposits received from the
public ranging from savings deposit (which are
repayable on demand) to 12 months' fixed deposits and,
consequently, has a direct bearing on the prime lending
rate at which banks are prepared to lend to their most
favoured customers.
The agreement has been rewritten since 1983 and,
specifically, has been amended to exclude large sums of
short-term deposits, which are defined as deposits of
HK$500,000 and above for periods of less than 3 months.
This type of deposit.is permitted to be taken by
licensed DTCs which, if this amendment had not been
made, would have obtained a monopoly on this class of
deposits at unrestricted rates of interest.
14
Lastly, it should be specified that since the
pegging of the Hong Kong Dollar to the US Dollar in
1983, the Hong Kong Association of Banks has found it
necessary to adjust the deposit interest rates more
often to absorb the fluctuations in the exchange rate.
15
CHAPTER IV
A BRIEF REVIEW OF
JAPAN'S BANKING SYSTEM
Japan is economically the second largest country
of the OECD group. The fast economic growth rate of
this nation is matched by very few nations of the world
today. She is a country comprised of four major islands
- Hokkaido, Honshu, Shikoku and Kyushu- and many small
islands. Most of the population is concentrated on
Honshu. At more or less the middle of the eastern
coastline of Honshu lies Tokyo, the capital of Japan
and also the largest city of the country. In 1985, an
estimated 8.3 million people were living in Tokyo,
representing 6.8% of Japan's total population.
4.1 The Central Bank- The Bank of Japan
Bank of Japan (BoJ) is the central Bank of Japan.
The functions of this bank include (1) sole issuer of
bank notes in Japan (2)* the government's bank (3) the
lender of last resort to commercial banks and (4) the
arbiter of monetary policy.
Although BoJ is the central bank, it is not part
16
of the government. In terms of ownership, the
government is merely the largest shareholder. It holds
55 percent of the bank's equity with the remaining 45
percent in the hands of large private investors who are
guaranteed a dividend yield of 5 percent a year.
Nevertheless, the officials at the Ministry of Finance
(MoF) view the bank simply as one of their branch
offices which is responsible for carrying out the
government's monetary policy. This is because MoF can
issue ordinances which have the legal backing of the
Cabinet but BoJ does not have such power. However,
during America's occupation of Japan (1946-1951), BoJ
had already been granted full independence. During the
post-war years, MoF and BoJ have usually agreed on
major issues. Moving on to the 1970's, in view of the
double digit inflation in Japan, BoJ is more inclined
to adopt more conservative policies. Conflicts may
occur between MoF and BoJ on issues such as when and
how much BoJ should intervene in the foreign exchange
markets, and the appropriate level of the discount
rate. However, because BoJ does not have such intensive
political power as MoF, the final solutions usually
conform with those that are favored by MoF.
4.2 Banks of Japan
The f inancial structure of Japan is higly
complex. There are many types of financial
17
institutions. However, the most important ones remain
those which are called "banks". The banks of Japan can
basically be classified into 3 categories- ordinary
banks, long-term credit banks and trust banks.
Ordinary Banks
Ordinary banks are those that carry out commercial
banking business under the Banking Law of 1981. Their
source of funds is mainly deposits and most of the
funds are channelled to long-term lending and
securities holding. Ordinary banks can be further
subdivided into four types- city banks, regional
banks, specialized foreign exchange banks and
authorized foreign exchange banks, and foreign banks.
City Banks
City banks are those that are based in large
cities but have a nation-wide network of branches.
There are 13 city banks (the Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank, the
Fuji Bank, the Sumitomo Bank, the Sanwa Bank, the
Mitsubishi Bank, the Tokai Bank, the Taiyo Kobe Bank,
the Mitsui Bank, the Daiwa Bank, the Kyowa Bank, the
Saitama bank, the Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, and the Bank
of Tokyo, a specialized foreign exchange bank). These
banks are the most important financial institutions in
Japan because of their large scale operations and their
command of 50 percent of the all the banks' financial
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resources. Their main areas of business are to deal
with big enterprises.
Regional Banks
Regional banks are those ordinary banks which are
based in local economic areas. Usually their
operations are concentrated in one prefecture with
extentions to neighboring prefectures. There are about
60 regional banks at present. The largest regional
banks are comparable to city banks in size although
they are smaller on the average. After World War II,
some regional banks even extended their operations to
big cities and set up branches in cities such as Tokyo
and Osaka. The clients of regional banks are mainly
regional enterprises.
Specialized Foreign Exchange Banks and
Authorized Foreign Exchange Banks
Under the Foreign Exchange and Foreign i,raae
Control Law, only authorized institutions can conduct
foreign exchange business. At present, there is one
specialized foreign exchange bank- Bank of Tokyo. The
other authorized foreign exchange institutions include
all the city banks, most of the regional banks, the
long-term credit banks, the trust banks, the foreign
banks and other financial institutions such as credit
associations, Sogo (mutual) banks, the Shoko Chukin
Rank_ the Norinchukin Bank and the Export-Import Bank
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of Japan.
The Bank of Tokyo was set up under the Foreign
Exchange Bank Law of 1954. Because of its wide-spread
branch network both domestically and overseas, it won a
high reputation in the foreign exchange business. The
other financial institutions which are authorized
foreign exchange banks can only carry out the foreign
exchange activities that are not as broad as those of
the Bank of Tokyo.
Foreign Banks
There are more than 70 foreign banks operating in
Japan at present. These foreign banks must seek a
licence before they start their business in this
nation. Therefore, in essence, they are allowed to
carry out similar kinds of business as other domestic
ordinary banks. All foreign banks are authorized
foreign exchange banks and actually foreign exchange
transactions are major sources of business for these
banks. Other businesses that these banks engage in
include receiving deposits, borrowing, issuing
certificates of deposits, and lending to both foreign
and Japanese enterprises, etc.
Long Term Credit Banks
The Long-Term Credit Bank Law of 1952 brougnt
about the emergence of long-term credit banks. At
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present, there are three such banks- the Industrial
Bank of Japan, the Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan and
the Nippon Credit Bank. At the time when the Long-Term
Credit Bank Law was drafted, Japan's capital market was
too undeveloped to meet all the demand for long-term
credit financing. Therefore, there was a need to
establish a kind of bank which concentrated on long-
term financing. This new system was to relieve the
ordinary banks from the pressure of providing long-term
credit for their clients. In fact, the major purpose
of creating long-term credit banks was to issue bank
debentures to substitute for the undeveloped capital
market.
At present, about 10 percent of the total lending
of all banks are provided by long-term credit banks.
These banks are also actively engaged in securities
operations as trustees or registrants. The recent
trend is that international operations are becoming
more important for these banks.
Trust Banks
Legally speaking, trust banks can ne viewea as
ordinary banks under the Bank Law. However, there are
seven banks in Japan which engage in the trust business
in accordance with the provisions of the Law Concerning
Ordinary Bank's Concurrent Management of Saving Bank or
Trust Bank Operations legislated in 1943. These banks
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are allowed to conduct general banking business but
they are given administrative guidance to concentrate
on the trust business. Long term finance and financial
management are the two main types of business that
these banks engage in. The long term finance business
includes loan trust and money in trust of which loan
trust is the main line. Loan trust provides a means
for tapping long-term savings from the public. As a
result, the long-term credit banks can provide long
term finance for both the private and public sectors.
For the financial management business, equipment in
trust, real estate in trust, monetary claims in trust,
securities investment trust, real estate business,
securities agency business and other concurrent
business are the main lines. The financial management
functions have become more important in recent years
due to the growth of the economy.
4.3 Supervision of the Banking System
The banking system of Japan is jointly monitored
by BoJ and Ministry of Finance (MoF). MoF is chiefly
concerned with the legislation while BoJ is primarily
concerned with the monetary control of banks. For
example, if a bank wants to engage in the securities
business, it must seek approval from the Finance
Minister. On the other hand, interest rates for bank
deposits in Japan are set by the Bank of Japan policy
22
board on the advice of the Interest Rate Adjustment
Council, a private advisory committee made up of
representatives of various sectors of the financial and
business communities. Interest rates are set at levels
which allow the weakest and most inefficient members of
the financial community to survive. Moreover, BoJ also
sets the reserve deposit requirements for the banks.
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CHAPTER V
A BRIEF REVIEW OF
SINGAPORE'S BANKING SYSTEM
Singapore is a city state located in Southeast
Asia. Though small in size and deficient in natural
resources, she has long been recognized as one of the
four small Asian dragons along with South Korea, Hong
Kong and Taiwan due to her fast economic growth rate.
Singapore was a British colony until 1963 when she
formed a federation with Malaysia. Singapore later
became a full sovereign state in 1963 because she was
unable to find a mutually acceptable relationship with
Malaysia. The economic take-off of this city state was
triggered by the entrepot trade which began to prosper
during the 1960's.
Singapore developed as an important financial
center in the 1970's as the government recognized the
need to broaden the economic base of the Republic and
realized that the financial and banking sector can also
contribute significantly to the economy rather than
1
just providing supportive fuctions for other sectors.
1
Tan Chwee Huat. Financial Markets and
Institutions in Singapore, 4th ed., Singapore:
Singapore University Press, 1985, p. 1.
24
5.1 The Monetary Authority of Singapore
At the apex of the banking system of Singapore is
the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), the quasi-
central bank. MAS not only acts as the banker to the
government and other banks, it also supervises and
regulates the whole financial system of the Republic.
In addition, MAS is also responsible for formulating
and implementing Singapore's monetary policies. MAS is
empowered by the laws to administer the Banking Act,
Finance Companies Act, Exchange Control Act,
Development Loans Act, Local Treasury Bills Act, and
the Insurance Act. Most of the financial institutions
such as commercial banks, Asian Currency Units
(ACUs), finance companies, and insurance companies have
to obtain licences from the MAS before they are allowed
to operate, whereas discount houses and merchant banks
have to seek specific approvals from the quasi-central
bank.
5.2 Commercial Banks
Before 1971, there was only one type of commercial
bank in Singapore. However, because the Singaporean
government wanted to develop the Republic into an
international financial centre but to avoid
disturbances to the local financial systems, MAS issued
licences to banks (especially foreign ones) for
25
conducting specialized lines of business. At present,
the commercial banks of Singapore can be divided into
three groups, full licence banks, restricted licence
banks, and offshore licence banks.
5.3 Full Licence Banks
Full licence banks are those that are allowed to
conduct a whole range of both retail and wholesale
banking activities. Such activities include accepting
current, savings and fixed deposits, the financing of
exports and imports, the transfer of funds, commercial
letters of credit, trust receipts, and the purchase and
sale of traveller's cheques and currencies. In
addition, the lines of business of a commercial bank
also include giving advice on trade and investment, and
foreign exchange regulations. They may also furnish
2
credit reports and trade information. At present, MAS
grants a new full licence to a bank only under
exceptional conditions, as most people agree that
Singapore is already overbanked in view of the size of
Singapore's economy.
Tan Chwee Huat. Financial Markets and
Institutions in Singapore, 4th ed., Singapore:
Singapore University Press, 1985, p. 19.
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5.4 Restricted Licence Banks
Restricted licence banks can carry out a whole
range of banking activities except:
(1) accepting time deposits of less S$250,000
(2) accepting savings accounts
(3) opening new branches in Singapore as they are
allowed to maintain one office only.
Because of the above restrictions, these banks
concentrate their efforts in the wholesale banking
business and trade actively in the foreign exchange as
well as the Asian Dollar Market. Their funding source
of Singapore dollars for financing loans relies heavily
on the local interbank market.
5.5 Offshore Licence Banks
When the concept of offshore banking was
introduced in 1973, offshore licence banks were only
allowed to carry out business outside Singapore for the
benefit of the region. They mainly concentrated their
business on foreign exchange and operating ACUs. They
were not allowed to accept deposits of any kind and
were permitted to transact business in Singapore with
banks and other approved institutions only. In dealing
with local residents, they were only allowed to grant
medium and long-term loans with a minimum of S$1
million and of two years or longer.
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However, starting from July 1978, all these
restrictions were abandoned. The only limitation that
is imposed on the offshore licence banks is that the
total amount loaned to a Singapore resident must not
exceed S$30 million at any one time. This relaxation
of the banking law in effect exposes the domestic banks
to the competition of offshore banks.
Apart from the three types of commercial banks
mentioned above, there are also the representative
offices of foreign banks. These offices perform a
correspondent banking relationship between Singapore
and other parts of the world. In many cases, these
representative offices may upgrade themselves to be
restricted licence banks or offshore licence banks.
5.6 The Asian Currency Units (ACUs)
An Asian Currency Unit is a special entity w1Liil
a financial institution which is granted a licence by
MAS to trade in the Asian Dollar Market. However, an
ACU must keep its own books of accounts to record its
transactions and has to be separated from the rest of
the financial institution. The separation of accounting
records allows the Asian Dollar Market to prosper as
funds can flow freely in and out of Singapore without
disturbing the domestic monetary management.
MAS has relaxed some of the restrictions on ACUs,
For instance, there is no need for them to keep a
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minimum cash balance with MAS and they are not bound by
the statutory liquidity requirement.
The ACUs can accept external non-resident deposits
without reference to the exchange control authority.
Their lines of business also include accepting deposits
from and lending to authorized institutions and non-
residents, and accepting deposits from residents in
foreign currencies of countries outside the Scheduled
Territories up to a certain limit. Because of the
operations of ACUs and other advantages offered by
Singapore, the Republic has become a major market for
the U.S. dollar.
5.7 Merchant Banks
Like merchant banks in other parts of the world,
Singapore's merchant banks offer a whole range of
services. The list of businesses that they engage in
include (1) corporate finance, (2) mergers and
acquisitions, (3) money market operations, (4)
investment management, (5) international financing, and
(6) corporate secretariat and other services.
The first merchant bank settled in Singapore in
March 1970. After that they came to Singapore for
various reason, e.g. the economic potential of
Southeast Asia, the attractions offered by the Asian
Dollar Market, the liberal policy of the Singapore
Government towards international financial expertise
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and institutions, and the infrastructure offered by
Singapore.
At present there is no law in Singapore that
specially caters for merchant banks. However, they
must seek the approval of MAS before they begin their
operations. A clear distinction between merchant banks
and other commercial banks is that they are not allowed
to accept deposits other than from banks and financial
institutions.
5.8 Supervision of the Banking System
,Ine n anKing system o Singapore is tignziy
supervised by the MAS. As a result, there has not been
a bank failure since 1913, when her first local bank,
Kwong Yik Bank, liquidated. In order to monitor the
banking system, MAS is allowed to carry out field
inspections of banks and to issue guidelines and
notices. Moreover, banks are required to submit
statistical returns and reports at regular intervals.
These documents reflect the financial status of the
banks, the directors, and the officers and employees,
plus the prudence of the banks' operations.
Ref eying to cash and liquidity requirements, banks
are required to keep a minimum cash balance with the
MAS. On top of that, a recent requirement imposed on
the banking sector is that banks must hold an amount of
statutory liquid assets which is no less than 15
30
percent of the eligible liabilities base. Singapore
government treasury bills and securities should count
for not less than 10 percent of the liabilities base.
This new requirement is to replace the old liquidity





After the Communists took over China in 1949, Hong
Kong enjoyed a period of peace and growth. In 1967,
Hong Kong experienced political turbulence for about
one year, when the Cultural Revolution broke out in
China. In the 70s, there was a high political stability
in Hong Kong. In fact, that was one of the reasons
for Hong Kong to develop as a major financial centre in
the world. However, in 1982-83 Hong Kong was badly hit
by a financial crisis. Although there were diverse
causes for the crisis, a prominent one was the 1997
issue. Capital outflow and portfolio shift accelerated
drastically after China announced its intention to
recover sovereignty over Hong Kong. Apprehension and
uncertainty over the future caused the collapse of both
the share and property markets in late 1982, although
the markets had already experienced severe strains in
the previous year due to volatile interest rates and
the onset of the world-wide recession. The erosion in
asset values in turn led to liquidity problems for
those banks and DTCs that were imprudently mismatched
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or over-exposed to the property and share markets.
Meanwhile, the government, which since the mid-
seventies had allowed expenditure to grow too rapidly
and had become heavily reliant on land sales for
revenue, was suddenly confronted with a fiscal crisis
mainly as a result of the property slump. There were
three consecutive years of fiscal deficit between 1982
and 1984, an unprecedented phenomenon in Hong Kong,
which used to pride itself on an almost unbroken record
of annual fiscal surpluses.
The financial crisis came to a head on 23rd
September 1983, when news was received that the Peking
talks had ended in deadlock, touching off an immediate
panic. On the next day, there was frantic buying of
the US dollar, pushing the exchange rate to
US$1=HK$9.6. More ominously, there were signs of a
general run on depository institutions, and panic
buying of staples by consumers. Faced with the
imminent collapse of the currency and the whole
financial system, the Hong Kong Government was
compelled to reverse its former policy stance, and
adopt a more interventionist approach. On the 15th
October 1983 the Government proclaimed a two-point
1
stabilisation programme. The first point, which was
of overriding importance, concerned the note-issuing
-Jao, Y.C. Hong Kong's Future as a Financial
Centre. The Three Bank Review, March 1985, pp. 35-53.
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mechanism. The two note-issuing banks, the Hong Kong
Shanghai Banking Corporation and the Standard Chartered
Bank, were required henceforth to pay to the Exchange
Fund, before they could issue notes, US dollars for the
Certificates of Indebtedness, the legal backing for the
notes, at a fixed rate of US$1=HK$7.8. The second
measure was the abolition of the interest withholding
tax on deposits denominated in Hong Kong dollars.
With the exception of 6th-14th July 1984, when
rumours about China's intentions in proposing the Joint
Liaison Group triggered off a sharp but short
speculative attack against the HK dollar, the linked
rate system has worked remarkably well.
The imposition of the foreign exchange constraint
was undoubtedly a major factor in the success of the
scheme. But an even more crucial factor was the much
improved political atmosphere from October 1983
onwards. In response to British concessions on
sovereignty and administration, China toned down its
propaganda campaign and have made more concrete
assurances on Hong Kong's rights and freedom after
1997. As prospects for a settlement brightened,
people's confidence towards the Chinese Government
increased.
The Sino-British Agreement reaffirms the status of
Hong Kong as an international. financial centre after
1997. Hong Kong's existing markets for foreign
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exchange, gold, securities and futures will continue to
operate. There will be the free flow of capital. The
Hong Kong dollar will continue to circulate and will
remain freely convertible.
Despite its short run success, the stabilisation
of the Hong Kong dollar is by no means fully assured.
Though the confidence of the people towards the Chinese
Government has increased, it is still very delicate.
This is due to the fact that China itself is not a very
politically stable country. In fact, power struggles
among the Communist parties in Mainland China had led
to political movements like the Cultural Revolution and
the wiping out of the Gang of Four. Like any other
international treaty, the Sino-British Agreement is
only as good as its faithful observance and
implementation. It should be stressed that there is
still considerable controversy and uncertainty on
whether China will be able, or willing, to fully honour
its commitments under the agreement.
In 1986, the Chinese Government's decision to
build a nuclear power plant at Daya Bay, which is only
50 kilometres from Hong Kong, also posed threats to the
confidence of the Hong Kong's citizens. There was a
strong voice of opposition in the community of Hong
Kong to the nuclear plant proposal as some local people
doubted the ability of the Chinese Government to manage
the nuclear plant properly.
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In January 1987, the Chinese Communist Party
General Secretary, Hu Yaobang, was forced to resign.
The cause of the enforced resignation was believed to
be Hu's failure to stop the students' demonstrations in
December 1986. Hundreds of students from Peking's
Qinghua University took to the streets demanding
democracy. Earlier that month in Shanghai, 2,000
students marched in defiance of a ban on rallies. The
students' movement was labelled as bourgeois
liberalisation by the Communist Party. A campaign
against bourgeois liberalisation is now underway. The
result, most observers believe, will be foot-dragging
on major economic and political reforms. This will
surely be a threat to the Hong Kong economy.
Although Hu's resignation only affected the Hong
Kong stock market and exchange rates for a short period
of time, such a panic could conceivably occur again
should there be another highly adverse political shock,
such as the renewed turmoil in China in the event, say,
of Deng's death, or a sharp reversal in China's present
pragmatic policies. Hong Kong people are now becoming
very sensitive to the political climate of China.
Japan6. 2
Japan has been a constitutional democracy since
1946. The parliament or Diet has the utmost legislative
authority. It is composed of two houses. The upper
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house is the House of Councillors and the lower house
is the House of Representatives. The Prime Minister is
the head of Government. Political power is highly
concentrated in the Diet and the civil service is also
very powerful.
The ruling party of Japan is the Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP)-. The LDP has been ruling Japan
since 1955. The Japan Socialist Party has been the
major opposition force to the LDP. Other important
opposing political parties are mainly communist or
socialist parties. However, inter-party conflicts are
less significant than the intra-party conflicts within
the LDP itself. The LDP can be divided into five
smaller factions with each of them trying to gain more
political support. This poses a potential threat to
the dominance of the LDP in the political scene of
Japan.
Mr. Yasuhiro Nakasone is the President of the LDP
as well as the Prime Minister of Japan. He was elected
to the present post in 1982. However, the Old Boss
as well as the former Prime Minister, Mr. Kakuei
Tanaka, was the person who had the greatest influence
within the party several years ago. The rise of Mr.
Nakasone is believed to be due to his close
relationship with Mr. Tanaka. Mr. Tanaka was involved
in a case of bribery and Mr. Nakasone was forced to
call an election to the House of Representatives under
great political pressure. Although Mr. Tanaka was re-
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elected in that election, the LDP lost 36 seats and its
overall majority. The LDP was thus forced to form an
alliance with the New Liberal Club. In 1985, Mr.
Tanaka suffered what doctors described as a mild
stroke and played no part in Japanese politics. Many
thought that Mr. Nakasone might step down. However, the
opposite turns out to be the truth. Though Nakasone's
faction was the fourth-ranking one inside the LDP, its
non-rivalry relationship with other factions enhanced
him to stand out to balance the intra-party conflicts.
In July 1986, Nakasone gambled his political
career by calling elections to both houses. The
landslide victory enabled the LDP to regain much of the
ground lost in 1983. This allowed Mr. Nakasone to
extend his premiership beyond the traditional rule that
a person cannot serve two consecutive two-year terms.
38
TABLE 1
PARTY STRENGTH IN THE DIET
(figures in brackets are pre-July 1986 election
House of House of
Representatives Councillorsa
Liberal Democratic Party 304 (250) 142 (137)
Japan Socialist Party 86 (111) 42 (42)
Komei Party 57 (59) 25 (27)
Japan Communist Party 16 (14)27 (27)
Democratic Socialist Party 12 (14)26 (37)
14 (13)12 (16)Others
251 247512 500Total
Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit. Country
Profile- Japan 1986-87, The Economist Intelligence
Unit, September 1986, p.3.
a
Half the seats were contested in the July 1986
election.
After the 1986 election, other opposing parties
cannot exert any major political pressure on the ruling
party. Nakasone's strong man figure, as a result of the
success of the LDP under his leadership in the 1986
election, enables him to maintain a harmonious
atmosphere among all factions within the LDP.
Therefore great political instability is unlikely to
happen in the near future. However, the appreciation of
the yen has greatly harmed the flourishing Japanese
economy. Unemployment has already reached an all time
high of 2.8 per cent and is forecasted to rise even
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higher in the future. The social structure of Japan
has also been changed. Lifetime job guarantees can no
longer be provided for the working population. The
unemployed workers may pose a potential threat to the
political stability. However, even with the forecasted
4.1 per cent unemployment rate in 1991, it is still
well below that of many Western countries. Therefore,
we can make a safe conclusion that Japan will continue
to enjoy and benefit from a stable political
environment.
6.3 Singapore
Among the 2.5 million population of Singapore,
about 76.4 per cent are Chinese, 14.9 per cent are
Malays, 6.4 per cent are Indians, other minorities made
up the remaining 2.3 per cent. The chief religions
include Islam, Buddhism, Taoism, Hinduism and
Christianity. Therefore Singapore can be said to be a
multi-racial, multi-religion society. In the 1950s and
1960s, there was a high level of conflict within the
society. However, any serious political split is
almost invisible in Singapore nowadays.
The People's Action Party (PAP) is the only
important party in Singapore. It almost monopolizes the
LRichardson, Ron. The End of Jobs-for-Life, Far
Eastern Economic Review, 22 January 1987, pp. 44-45.
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parliament's 79 seats by winning 77 seats in the 1984
election although there were nine parties competing.
The PAP has been ruling Singapore ever since 1959.
The political unity of Singapore is attributed to
the Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, who heads the PAP.
Lee was able to prove to the majority of Singaporeans
that their sacrifice of individual rights was
worthwhile by their glorious economic progress. In
return for economic well-being, the social contract
demands that the people deliver their obedience.
The PAP's dominance of the political scene in
Singapore faces two challenges at present. First, the
educational standard of the people has increased
tremendously. The number of students receiving higher
education approached 40,000 in 1985, which tripled the
number in 1970. They form a group which has the
potential to critically evaluate the government's
policies. Accessibility to western democratic ideas
through books, magazines, newspapers, TV and travel may
induce people to demand more from the government rather
than mere economic well-being-.
Second, Singapore has reached such a stage of
economic development that a double-digit annual real
GDP growth rate is hardly achieved at present. The
economic downturn of 1985 provides the opposition
parties with an opportunity to criticize the economic
policies of the ruling party.
In the 1984 election, the PAP won 62.94 percent of
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the votes. Though an unchallenged absolute victory in
comparison with western democratic countries, it was
outshone by the election of 1980 with 75.55 percent of
the votes supporting the PAP. Is that an indication of
the people's declining confidence in the PAP? Perhaps
it is fair to say that Mr. J. B. Jeyaretnam, leader of
the Workers' Party (WP), who is considered to be the
chief political opponent of Prime Minister Lee, still
has a long and winding road to form a sizable
opposition force against the PAP. However, the golden
days of the Singaporeans' absolute reliance and
confidence in the government has passed. The ruling
party must formulate prudent policies to gain the
continual support of the people.
Two events recently caused slight disturbances to
the orderly political image of Singapore. First, the
Singapore government restricted circulation of the
Asian Wall Street Journal to 400 copies from its usual
sales of 5,000 copies starting from February 18, 1987.
The penalty was awarded because the paper refused to
publish an official reply to an article on a proposed
unlisted securities market. A similar action had been
taken earlier against Time magazine by cutting its
3
circulation from 18,000 a week to 2,000. This action
The Asian Wall Street Journall 20-21 February 1987,




has deteriorated Singapore's foreign image. In an
interview, Mr. David Li (Chief Manager and a Director
of the Bank of East Asia of Hong Kong) said Singapore's
action could be counterproductive because businessmen
prefer to operate in an environment where there is open
debate and free access to information. He further
commented that restrictions on the flow of information
would not be welcomed by people who were thinking of
4
investing in Singapore or doing business there.
Though banning the mass media is more an exception
than a norm, this event shows that businessmen doing
business in Singapore must conform to the policies and
guidelines of the government. Bankers may have a
second thought before they set up their operations in
Singapore.
The second event was the official visit to
Singapore by the President of Israel, Chaim Herzog,
last November. The Malay community of Singapore reacted
unfavourably to President Herzog's visit. A number of
meetings had been held between Malay groups and MPs of
the PAP. This event has not created any serious
political stress within this multi-racial community.
However, it posed the question of which should be given
A hiaher priority by the Singaporeans- their country
4 U.S. Criticizes Singapore for Journal Ban, The
Asian Wall Street Journal, 11 February 1987, p.
43
or their religion?
To summarize, Singapore is a politically stable
country. Although there are some challenges to the
ruling PAP and small disturbances to the harmony of
this city state, great political disorder is unlikely
to occur, at least in the near future.
6.4 Concluding Remarks
To summarize, Singapore and Japan are politically
stable countries. As Hong Kong people are still plagued
by the 1997 issue, they are very sensitive to any
political disturbances inside Mainland China.
Therefore, politically Hong Kong is in a less
favourable position. The future of Hong Kong as an
international banking centre will depend largely on the
commitment on the part of China to the Sino-British
agreement and the continuation of the open-door






Following a year of dismal performance, the local
economy regained its growth momentum in 1986. The
turnaround has been led by exports, which began to move
ahead in March 1986. There was a 6.6 per cent growth in
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at the end of 1986, much
higher than the forecast at the beginning of the year.
There are two obvious reasons for the upturn in
foreign trade. The first relates to overseas business
conditions that indeed had improved due to the sharp
decline in the prices of oil and other commodities.
This price reduction contributed to an increase in real
income in major industrialized countries, through a
fall in inflation and a general improvement in terms of
trade.
The other major and more widespread explanation
for the sudden improvement in Hong Kong's external
trade is linked to the decline in the Hong Kong dollar
exchange rate via the US dollar to which it is tied.
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The relative cost structure when translated into export
prices through exchange rates has lowered. The
exchange advantage has been most obvious in the German
and Japanese markets, where the rebound in Hong Kong
exports has been the sharpest.
The devaluation has also worked in markets outside
Japan and West Germany. The strong yen has hit Japan's
exports seriously. Importers elsewhere would look for
alternate sources of supply to make up for higher
priced Japanese products. Hong Kong is benefited by
supplying goods that can substitute for the Japanese
products, though there is the pressure of competition
from neighbouring countries like South Korea and
Taiwan.
The price situation has been stable for the last
two years. In 1986, price increases were kept below an
annual rate of 3.5 per cent. The world inflation rate
and the exchange value of the Hong Kong dollar have
always been the two major external factors shaping the
inflation rate. Through their impacts on import
prices, these two factors have accounted for much of
Hong Kong's past inflation experience.
Since 1980, the world economy has been undergoing
a disinflationary process. But as the Hong Kong dollar
suffered notable depreciation in the early 80s, the
territory lagged behind in price stability until the
adoption of the linked rate system in October 1983.
46
Thereafter, an appreciating local currency together
with falling world-wide inflation started to pull down
the inflation rate from 8.3 per cent in 1984 to 3.4 per
cent in 1985.
Though the yen appreciation is the major factor
for Hong Kong's export-led economic growth, it does
provide an adverse effect to the local economy. As
Japan remains our dominant supplier of both capital and
consumer goods, the Hong Kong dollar's sharp
depreciation against the yen has resulted in much
higher prices for these items. For the first 11 months
of 1986, import prices of consumer goods rose 9 per
cent, while that for capital goods shot up 16 per cent.
Hong Kong has lagged behind South Korea and Taiwan
in exports since 1985. For more than a decade, Hong
Kong, South Korea and Taiwan have strived to broaden
and diversify their industrial bases, focusing on
capital and technology intensive production. South
Korea and Taiwan have now seemingly outperformed Hong
Kong in many areas. It is disheartening to note that
very few upcoming export items emerged in Hong Kong
during the 80s. Compared to Hong Kong, South Korea has
achieved a much greater success in product
diversification, with ships, thermionic valves, office
machine and automobiles now accounting for 21 per cent
of total export sales. These items constituted only 7
per cent of the country's exports in 1980. Taiwan has
also achieved notable growth in electrical machinery,
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metal products and plastic products. With a commodity
pattern so heavily weighted toward textiles and
apparel, which are so vulnerable to protectionist
pressure, Hong Kong would be in a less advantageous
position than South Korea and Taiwan over the long run.
Activity in the property sector was buoyant in
1986, following successive cuts in interest rates and
more generous mortgage terms offered by commercial
banks. Private flats were able to record a steady rise
in prices. In addition, the relaxation of rent controls
also helped push up housing costs.
One salient feature of Hong Kong's economic life
in recent years is the rapidly expanding number of ties
with China. Hong Kong accounts for about 18 per cent
of China's foreign direct investment. Example of
China's investments in Hong Kong are the buyout of the
Ka Wah Bank by the China Interna.onal Trust and
Investment Corp (CITIC), the takeover of the Union Bank
by China Merchants Steam Navigation (CMSN) in
conjunction with the Search Group, and China's
involvement in the two Hong Kong based airlines,
namely, Cathay Pacific Airways and Dragonair.
In the stock market, the Hang Seng Index rose 47
per cent in 1986. The-index at year-end of' 86 was
2568.30, against 1752.45 at the end of the previous
year. The market came to its historical high of
2939.05 on 3rd March 1987. Then followed a series of
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adjustments, and the index dropped to around 2,720 in
mid March. The Hong Kong stock market is famous for
its volatility.
Outlook
In 1987, the advantages of currency depreciation
are unlikely to persist, as the US dollar tends to move
within a more stable band. Export sales will thus
hinge almost entirely on the level of ultimate demand
in overseas markets rather than on comparative price
advantage. The overall rate of growth, however, will
be affected by reinforced protectionist sentiments
abroad. The US is the most obvious example. The
problem will be intensified as the Democrats, who have
a greater commitment to protectionist measures than the
Republicans as a party, now control both Houses of
Congress.
Looking into 1987, domestic inflationary pressure
is expected to persist. Property prices will continue
to move up. In addition, the high level of liquidity
in the economy would keep consumer demand generally
buoyant. The main inflationary pressure in 1987,
however, will still come from the external sector. Oil
prices will be a major factor affecting inflation. The
imported inflation due to the appreciation of the yen
will be more obvious this year. Taking all these
factors into consideration, the inflation rate for 1987
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is expected to be higher than that for the previous
year.
7.2 Japan
Perhaps the most important influence on Japan's
economy in the past few years was the persistent climb
of the yen against the dollar over the last two years.
The appreciation of the yen is a response to the U.S.'s
complaint about the enormous trade surplus of Japan.
The impact is felt in every part of the economy. The
real GNP growth rate has been slowed down. The
estimated real GNP growth rate for 1986 is 2.5 per cent
as against 4.5 per cent in 1985.
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TABLE 2
REAL GNP GROWTH RATE IN JAPAN










Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit. country
Report- Japan, The Economist Intelligence Unit,
December 15, 1986, pp. 2-3.
Apart from growing less rapidly, the economy of
Japan is also undergoing basic structural changes.
First, in the next few years, we shall see more and
more production shifting from Japan to other newly
industrialised countries of Asia or to the U.S.
Singapore may be a country that will benefit from the
strong yen. Japanese investment in Singapore rose from
US$ 244.1 million in 1985 to US$ 489.7 million in
1986. Industries that are forced to emigrate from
their motherland in order to avoid the high domestic
1Holloway, Nigel. Electrical Connections, Far
Eastern Economic Review, 12 March 1987, p. 90.
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production costs which are denominated in yen include
companies ranging from electronics to shipbuilding and
from motors to ball-bearings.
The exodus of industrial operations poses the
second structural change of the Japanese economy.
Japan had always been able to prove to the world that
she could progress with a full-employment society. In
fact, many Japanese workers benefit from lifetime job
guarantee. However, this is unlikely to be so in the
future. A study predicts that 900,000 additional
Japanese workers will be out of a job in 1991, on top
2
of the near 1.6 million now without work. This means
that by 1991 the unemployment rate will be 4.2 per cent
as compared with the present record high of 2.8 per
cent.
The third structural change is that future growth
will be more internally generated rather than the
present export-led. Japanese industries have to turn
to the domestic market as the competitive edge of her
exports will suffer from the high yen. Luckily, Japan
has a large population of 120 million to generate
enough domestic demand. However, Japan does not have
many natural resources. She must rely heavily on
GRichardson, Ron. The End of Jobs-For-Life.
Far Eastern Economic Review, 22 January 1987, p. 44.
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imports for oil and other raw materials. As a result,
she must rely on exports to generate enough foreign
exchange for imports. Therefore, she must depend on
exports, though in a lesser extent than at present, to
generate economic growth.
The fourth impact of the yen appreciation is that
some industries will fade out gradually. On the top of
the list of these industries are coal, non-ferrous
metal and steel. At present, Japan's own steel-makers
refuse to buy the nation's own coal. The already
deficit-ridden steel industry has to cut 4 3,000
(US $1 8.46) a tonne of steel in doing business with the
motor industry. This action is caused by the leaders
of the motor industry who pointed out that more cars
may have to be made abroad if the steel price remained
3
out of line with the international level.
The fifth impact of the yen appreciation is that
it causes the service industries to grow. As the
manufacturing sector has a relative disadvantage and
the economy must depend on domestic demand for economic
growth, the service industries become the natural focus
for investment. Takashi Ishihara, Chairman of Nissan
Motor Co., in an interview pointed out that the wealth
of the manufacturing sector had weakened and that
securities companies, banks and superstores (general
-0 Smith, Charles. The Yen Strikes Home, Far
Eastern Economic Review, 25 December 1986, p.61-.
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store chains) were the ones with money in today's
Japan. The trend can also be seen by the business
diversification plan of one of the Big Five
integrated steel makers, Kobe Steel. Kobe Steel
decided to shift some of the surplus workers in the
steel-making operation to a dozen subsidiary service
companies in order to reduce the excess capacity in the
steel plants.
The shift from a manufacturing-oriented to
service-oriented economy will be particularly conducive
to the growth of Tokyo as an international banking
centre. As the banking business is closely related to
companies such as securities firms, the rise of those
will certainly promote the banking business.
TABLE 3
CORPORATE STRATEGIES-
WHAT JAPANESE COMPANIES WILL DO


















Source: Keidanren survey of major corporate
members Quoted in Smith Charles, The Yen Strikes
Home. Far Eastern Economic Review, 25 December 1986
p.61
a Figures do not add up to 100 due to rounding.
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7.3 Singapore
In the 1960's and 1970's. Singapore was regarded
to be one of the fastest growing countries in the
world. The average per annum growth of real gross
domestic product (GDP) was 8-.8 per cent in the 1960's
and 8.5 per cent in the 1970's. Due to her strategic
location within the South East Asian region, entrepot
trade was one of the two pillars of the economy in the
early 1960's. The other major source of income was the
U.K. military expenditure, which accounted for about
one sixth of the total GDP at that time and employed 20
percent of the working population.
The economic development of Singapore can be
divided into 3 phases. The first phase was from 1966
to 1973. During this period, the main objective was job
creation and basic industrialisation. The flourishing
international trade together with Singapore's liberal
trade policy caused the economy to grow at a rapid
pace. GDP expanded by 12.3 per cent per annum during
this period.
The second phase (1974-77) was a period of world-
Information Division, Ministry of Communications
and Information. Singapore 1986, Singapore: Information
Division, Ministry of Communications and Information,
1986, p.1.
The Economist Intelligence Unit. Country Profile
- Singapore 1986-87, The Economist Intelligence Unit,
September 1986, F.78.
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wide inflation and economic decline. Singapore was
able to overcome this difficult period by upgrading her
industry to the more sophisticated areas of production.
The average annual real GDP growth rate was 6.4 per
cent in these four years.
The government's efforts to radically restructure
Singapore's economy was the major impetus behind the
third phase (1974-84)-. Should the government's plan
turn out to be a successful one, Singapore would be a
center of excellence for technology, manufacturing and
services. To carry out its plan, the government
6
adopted a high wage policy in 1979. It was possible to
do so because Singapore was fully employed at that time
and foreign labor, including professionals and skilled
workers, had to be imported. Employers were encouraged
to mechanize, computerize and manage more efficiently.
The government's policies seemed to work because real
GDP grew at an average of 8.8 per cent during the whole
period. However, the growth rate of the high technology
industries did not parallel the government's
expectation and the high growth rate of the economy was
unlikely to sustain itself if the government did not
pump enough money into the construction sector. A
downturn in the external demand in 1985 seriously hit
0 Information Division, Ministry of Communications
and Information. Singapore 1986, Singapore: Information
Division, Ministry of Communications and Information,
1986. P. 2.
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this little city state. Real GDP for the first time
since 1964 experienced a negative growth rate.
Even before the 1,.8 per cent real GDP decline
became visible, the Minister for Trade and Industry
appointed an Economic Committee under the chairmanship
of the then Minister of State for Trade and Industry,
Brig-Gen (Res) Lee Hsien Loong to look into the various
sectors of the economy. The conclusion of the interim
report by this Committee in July 1985 pointed out that
Singapore's high-technology policy had to seek new
directions to enable Singapore to remain competitive
against other newly industrialising countries such as
7
Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea.
The economic decline in 1985 extended to the first
quarter of 1986. After that, the economy started to
rebound and the result was that GDP rose 1.9 percent in
1986. The recovery of the economy was chiefly due to
two factors. First, the government restrainted the
wage level and labor costs were pulled down. Second,
the demand for manufactures, and transport and
communications services was strong. Prime Minister Lee
Kuan Yew said that the economy will continue to grow if
the two advantages could be maintained. The economic
decline of Singapore in 1985 reflects that the economy
7Information Division, Ministry of Communications
and Information. Singapore 1986, Singapore: Information
Division, Ministry of Communications and Information,
1986.p.3.
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is highly vulnerable to the external demand. The
revival in 1986 was in many ways due to the upsurge of
exports to the US by 17 per cent, which covered 37.5
per cent of the domestic exports. Exports to Japan and
Malaysia fell by 14 per cent and 13 per cent
respectively. With the increasing trade protectionism
on the side of the US, it is unlikely that exports to
the US will have a promising growth in the future.
However? Singapore is unable to promote exports to
other chief markets, as reflected by the downturn of
exports to Japan and Malaysia. Therefore, it is
questionable if Singapore can maintain an economic
growth rate which is comparable to that of the past.
The government forecasts that the economy will grow by
3-4 per cent in 1987. However, many analysts think
that this is too optimistic.
7.4 Concluding Remarks
To summarize, Tokyo has the advantage of having an
overwhelmingly large domestic market as its hinterland.
The national income of Hong Kong and Singapore cannot
be in any way compared with that of Japan. However,
in terms of growth rate of national income, Hong Kong
seems to have the brightest prospects. Singapore is
just recovering from the downturn of the economy while
Japan is suffering from the yen revaluation. The major
challenges that Hong Kong will face in the near future
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are protectionism and inflationary pressure. If Hong
Kong can overcome these two obstacles, the economy will
grow at a steady rate and stimulate the growth of





As mentioned in the previous chapters, Hong Kong
was badly hit by a financial crisis in 1982-83. The
event led to financial difficulties for those banks and
DTCs which over-lent to the property and share markets.
Because of this, a review of the legal framework of the
financial sector was undertaken and legislation to
amend the DTC Ordinance and the Banking Ordinance was
passed in December 1983.
In September 1983, a locally incorporated bank,
the Hang Lung Bank limited, was found to be in
financial difficulty. In June 1985, another two
problem banks emerged. In these cases the Government
took over and supported the banks in order to uphold
the creditability of the banking system in Hong Kong.
There were problems facing other banks and these have
been solved by capital injection, take-overs by
financially stronger institutions, or some forms of
support from the Government.
Table 4 shows a list of banks that experienced
financial difficulties within the last two years.
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TABLE 4




1. Sun Hung Kai Bank Limited Arab Bank Group
2. Oversea Trust Bank Limited H. K. Government
3. Hong Kong Industrial and H. K. Government
Commercial Bank Limited
IN 1986
China International5. Ka Wah Bank Limited
Trust and Investment
Corp
Hang Seng Bank6. Wing On Bank Limited
china Mercnants7. Union Bank
Steam Navigation andof Hong Kong Limited
the Search Group
First Pacific8. Hong Nin Bank Limited
Holdings
Source: Tight security may cut failures,
Hong Kong Review 1987 (Sunday Morning Post),
January 1987, p. 34.
Now known as the International Bank of Asia
Limited.
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Very often, the Government had to use the Exchange
Fund to save those insolvent institutions. Credit
lines were made available and actually tapped from the
Exchange Fund to help the institutions avoid a run or
collapse while negotiations with prospective purchasers
were under way. The spending of public money for such
purposes caused resentment in some sectors of the
society and sparked heated debate among Legislative
Councillors.
In 1984, the Government commissioned a small team
from The Bank of England to review the banking
legislation and supervision system in Hong Kong. Their
report formed the basis of some of the reforms proposed
by the Banking Commissioner in 1985. These proposals
were subjected to a process of consultation with the
banking sector and other interested parties, and
resulted in the publication of a Banking Bill on March
7, 1986. Following further comments on the Bill and
more than 100 detailed amendments, the Banking
Ordinance 1986 was passed by the Legislative Council on
May 28 and gazzetted on May 30. The new Ordinance
consolidates and amends the law relating to the
business of banking and deposit-taking and replaces the
former Banking and Deposit Taking Companies Ordinances.
The most important changes introduced by this
Ordinance concern six areas: the commissioner of
Banking's role, co-ordination with auditors, regulation
of ownership and management, limitation in lending,
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capital adequacy ratio and liquidity ratio.
The new Banking Ordinance aims at providing a
measure of protection to depositors and promoting the
general stability and effective working of the banking
system. Now the Commissioner for Banking has clearly
defined powers and a clearly defined role, and the
banks know how far the government is prepared to go in
regulating their activities.
One area of change in the new Ordinance is related
to audit. The weaknesses in audit may be seen from a
damage suit filed by the Overseas Trust Bank (OTB) in
the High Court against its auditors, Coopers and
1
Lybrand, and three of its overseas partners. The legal
documents filed by the bank revealed that The reason
(why) OTB was so seriously weakened, virtually
insolvent or insolvent, was that the conduct and
operation of its banking business, (and) in particular
the lending, had been imprudent. It added: Had
Coopers and Lybrand performed their contracts in the
periods leading up to October 1981, 1982 and 1983, when
they did their audit work, Coopers and Lybrand would
have discovered the extent and seriousness of such
imprudence, and would have recommended substantial
additional provisions and/or would have qualified their
audit reports accordingly.
1OTB blames auditor, South China Morning Post
(Business Post), 7 March 198, p.l.
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To deal with weaknesses in audit, the Commissioner
may in future refer to the Disciplinary Committee of
the Society of Accountants any cases of serious
misconduct by the auditors.
Details of the capital adequacy ratio and the
liquidity ratio will be shown in the Appendix
separately. It should be noted that the new requirement
on capital adequacy will not apply to Hong Kong
branches of foreign institutions.
More recently, the Commissioner of Banking is
embarking on a review of the three-tier system under
which local authorised financial institutions have
2
operated since 1981. This is due to a changing role of
the DTC sector. An increasing number of registered
DTCs have either taken no deposits or have given up




Deposit company system studied, South China
Morning Post (Business Post), 18 March 1987,p.l.
3
New bank law hits DTCs, South China Morning
Post (Business Post), 18 January 1987, p.l.
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B. 2 Japan
The deregulation of Japan's financial markets in
recent years is a result of the formation of the Japan-
US Yen-Dollar Committee two years ago. The
deregulation process forces the banks of Japan to take
an international view and also attracts a large number
of foreign banks to establish branches in Japan.
Before any bank can begin its operations in Japan,
it is required to get the approval from the Ministry of
Finance. At present, the laws in Japan treat foreign
banks more or less the same as the domestic banks.
This is favorable for Tokyo to increase its status as
an international banking centre. Apart from examining
whether a foreign bank meets a certain minimum
necessary level of soundness, the authority of Japan
will grant a banking licence to the foreign bank bases
on the principle of reciprocity. That is the Japanese
officials will find out whether Japanese banks are
allowed to operate and carry out more or less the same
kinds of business that foreign banks in Japan are
conducting, in the country from which the foreign banks
originate. With an increasing number of Japanese banks
opening overseas branches, it is likely that the
Japanese authority will permit more foreign banks to
enter the domestic market.
A significant impact of the deregulation of Japan
+-hi=, cue of banking is on the interest rates of
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deposits. In the past, banks in Japan had to follow
the guidelines on interest rates issued by the Bank of
Japan (the central bank) for all deposits. However,
the rates for large deposits have now been freed.
Banks can have their own rates on deposits for more
than 11 billion from October 1, 19851 and on deposits
4
of 1500 million from April, 1986. Moreover, in May,
1986, interest rates on money-market certificates of
more than 110 million (about US$60,000) were also
freed. The foreign banks should welcome this
liberalization. This is because many foreign banks do
not have sufficient funds derived from their local
deposits to fund their lending. Very often, they have
to rely on the short-term money market. However,
according to Mr. Michael Tomalin, general manager of
Barclays Bank in Japan, the interbank market in Japan
5
is relatively undeveloped. The liberalization of
interest rates on large amount deposits will bring the
interest rates more in line with the market demand and
supply. As the depositors in Japan are yield
conscious, they will put their money with the
institutions that offer them high returns. To overcome
their problem of funding sources, foreign banks can
q
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raise their interest rates to attract large depositors.
The second impact of deregulation is that many
banks are allowed to do some businesses that they were
barred from doing so before. Japan used to have a
banking system with a high demarcation about the
functions and therefore the kinds of business that
different types of banks were allowed to engage in.
The boundaries between different types of banks are now
slightly blurred by deregulation. At present, there
are nine foreign banks that are allowed to enter the
trust business and can now manage pension funds and
other pools of capital which were traditionally
monopolized by the trust banks. They are Union Bank of
Switzerland, Credit Suisse, Bankers Trust, Barclays,
Chase Manhattan, Chemical, Citicorp, Manufacturers
6
Hanover and Morgan Guaranty. There is plenty of
business for these new foreign trust banks due to two
reasons. The saving level is high among the Japanese
and there is a good demand for high return investments.
Pension funds become a natural outlet for these
unprofessional investors. During the past few years,
pension fund assets have increased at 12-15 per cent a
year and are estimated to have reached Y19.5 trillion
(nearly US$120 billion). Nicholas C. Potter, president
of J.P. Morgan Investment Management Inc., the trust
eFull of Western Promise, Euromoney, March 1986,
p. 73.
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subsidiary of Morgan in Tokyo, said that there is a
tremendously rich market: the cash flows of the
insurance companies and pension funds are just
7
exploding.
An equivalent of the US Glass-Steagall Act could
be found in Japan. Banks were prohibited from
underwriting or dealing in securities, and they could
not own more than 5% of a securities firm. However,
since 1985, banks have been allowed to deal in public
government bonds. The price for the banks is that the
securities firms can now deal in certificates of
deposit. It is just like a game of give-and-take. If a
particular kind of bank is allowed to enter into a new
area of business, they must be ready to forego some of
their monopolistic power in other areas. The entry of
the banks in the securities business has proved a even
bigger step for foreign banks. Three foreign banks,
Swiss Bank Corporation, Baring Brothers and Dresdner,
were invited in April 1986 to submit final applications
for securities licenses to join the affiliates of
Security Pacific and Deutsche Bank which had already
been granted such licenses. However, they must form
subsidiaries which involve a 50 per cent participation
by a non-financial company to carry out the securities
7
An Exciting Market- For Tough Players Only,




The cases mentioned above concerning the entry of
foreign banks into trust and securities businesses seem
to show that foreign banks are the ones that are given
preferential treatment in the deregulating process.
George Streichenberg, chairman of Swiss Bank
Corporation International, attributes the sudden move
to universal banking in Japan to the aspiration of
Japanese banks that they will receive similar treatment
8
in the foreign markets.
The deregulation process so far has offered
foreign banks new opportunities and therefore Japan
should be able to attract even more foreign banks into
Tokyo. Moreover, the deregulation also increases the
activities that banks can conduct. These two factors
may reinforce the advantages that Tokyo offers as an
international banking center. However, the
deregulation process is expected to advance slowly.
Japan is a country where a common consensus has to be
reached before any reform can take place. Therefore,
any further liberalization will have to involve
consultation among all parties that are affected. it
may take years before another important part of the law
is relaxed or a new law is passed.
8 Freedom Never Got Very Far, Euromoney, June
1986, p.92.
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Apart from being highly restricted in the kinds of
business that a bank can conduct, the banking sector is
also suffering from the ambiguity of Japanese laws.
The head of one foreign bank once pointed out that very
little was codified in Japan. In the U.S. or U.K., a
legal problem can be settled by reference to the case
laws. In Japan, however, it is the customs and
guidelines of the appropriate government office or
ministry that are given greater importance.
8.3 Singapore
The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) is the
sole agent of the Singapore government to supervise the
banking sector. The power of the MAS is derived from
the Banking Act, Chapter 182.
In order to carry out its supervisory duties, the
MAS is empowered to grant bank licenses and inspect the
accounts of the banks. When a commercial bank applies
for a banking license so as to start its operations in
Singapore, the MAS will look into several matters:
1. whether the bank has a solid financial background
2. whether they have enough international banking
experience so as to enable them to provide
sophisticated banking services
3. whether the bank has a good management team and
are of undoubted integrity
4. whether the bank is willing to bring into
71
Singapore the most capable expertise
5. whether the bank can upgrade the technical know-
how of the local staff-,
6. whether the bank can introduce new financial
services to Singapore and attract new business to
9
the local economy.
Nowadays, it is almost impossible to grant a full
banking license or a restricted banking license to a
new foreign bank. Very often, new foreign banks are
given an offshore license with an Asian Currency Unit
(ACU) license attached. This is a way to protect the
small depositors. However, this also limits the types
of business that foreign banks can conduct and is
therefore a disadvantage for the foreign banks.
Although merchant banks are not required by the
Banking Act to seek a licence, they are still required
to get approval from the MAS. Very often a merchant
bank has an ACU attached to it. The ACU is subject to
the Banking Act and is also supervised by the MAS.
For both foreign commercial banks and merchant
banks, the MAS has the authority to request their
overseas headoffice to support their establishments in
Singapore in case their subsidiaries have financial
9 Peat, Marwick, Mitchell Co. Banking in




In order to ensure that the banking system runs
smoothly, the MAS is empowered to carry out on-site
inspections of commercial and merchant banks. These
financial institutions are also required to submit
their financial statistics regularly. The MAS also
relies, to a certain extent, on the work of external
and internal auditors to check whether the banks are
following the Banking Act, the Companies Act, the MAS
notices, directives, guidelines and other relevant laws
and regulations. The MAS may also require the external
auditor to put into an external auditors' long form
report their findings and recommendations on the banks'
accounting systems, internal control systems, foreign
exchange transactions, quality of loans, advances and
other assets, violations of the Banking Act if any and
other areas of weaknesses. If the MAS finds it
necessary, it can widen the scope of an audit or carry
out specific procedures.
After conducting such detailed auditing
procedures, the MAS can force the banks to take
corrective actions if they are found to have financial
problems or are unable to meet the provision of the
Banking Act, guidelines or directives in certain areas.
The MAS may wind up a problematic institution by making
a petition to the Higher Court. When conditions become
necessary, the MAS may also revoke the banking licence
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of a commercial bank or withdraw the approval of a
merchant bank.
Given that the MAS has such large power to
supervise the banking system, Singapore's banking
sector is one of the safest in the world, with almost
no banking failure. Even with a worldwide trend of
banking deregulation in recent years, Singapore has
never loosened its control over the banks. At present,
many governments in the world have opened the domestic
markets to the competition of foreign banks. However,
in Singapore, a clear line has been drawn between the
domestic banking unit and the ACU. Only twenty-five
out of the one hundred and twenty foreign banks are
allowed access to the domestic market. This is because
the government wants to keep the interest rates and
foreign exchange rates structures under control. In
other parts of the world, banks are allowed to provide
a full range of financial services so as to even out
the fixed overheads. This is not so in Singapore. The
government fears that the banks do not have the ability
to maintain a prudential internal supervision if the
banking activities are allowed to grow at a fast pace.
Clearly, Singapore has a relatively tight legislation
over the banking sector with the MAS as an agent of
supervision. As Mr. Richard Hu, Chairman of the MAS
said, The regulator's primary responsibility is to
ensure that the banking system is prudently supervised
an ghat the depositors' funds are not at risk, and in
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that area increased supervision is absolutely
10
necessary.
8.4 Comparison of the Legislation
of the Three Places
In a worldwide trend of deregulation, Japan has
liberalized many of her banking laws. The freeing of
interest rates on large amount deposits and allowing of
some of the banks to enter the securities and trust
businesses are the most important examples. However,
deregulation has had little impact on Singapore and it
is still a place where the government has a close
control on the banking sector. For Hong Kong, the
Banking Ordinance passed in 1986 actually tightened
some of banking laws. Hong Kong had been regarded as
having a set of loose banking laws. This had been one
of the reasons for so many foreign banks setting up
their businesses here. However, with the bank failures
mentioned above, the government saw that there really
was a need to revise the laws to ensure a smooth
running banking sector. Therefore, we can say that
Japan is liberalising the banking laws, Singapore
continues to have a heavy hand on the banking sector
lvHu's Hand Firmly on the Tiller, Euromoney,
June 1986, p. 87.
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but Hong Kong is moving against the trend of
deregulation. However, even after the imposition of
the new Banking Ordinance in Hong Kong, it is still the




INFRASTRUCTURE AND PHYSICAL ATTRIBUTES
9. 1 Rents
Hong Kong
The market for office space in Hong Kong is
currently extremely tight. Jones Lang Wootton (JLW)
reckons that the vacancy rate for Grade A office space
(based on an index of grade A. B and C office space)
reached an historic low of around 2.5 per cent. The
tightness may be eased with the new supply of
commercial buildings and the vacancy rate is forecasted
by JLW to reach 8.5 per cent in 1988. Space in
Exchange Square complex (Towers I and II) is let at a
rate of around HK$29-30 per ft per month net
(US$40.40-41.82 per m). Office space in the Landmark
currently lets for HK$24-26 per ft (US$33.51-36.30
per m). In the less prestigious region of Wanchai,
the Great Eagle Centre asks rentals of HK$15-17 per ft
(US$20.94-23.73 per m). Therefore we can have a
jRowley, Anthony. Moving Up Again As the Market
Discounts 1997, Far Eastern Economic Review, 12 March
1987p p. 42.
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reasonable estimate that the average office rental of
2
Hong Kong is around HK$20 per ft (US$27.92 per m).
Tokyo
The property value of Tokyo has experienced a
skyrocketing rise of almost three times in the past two
years. The record was so high that it reached
2
Y36 million (US$234,527) per m in a land deal in the
2
Ginza district in late 1985. The high land value is
due to three factors.
First, and perhaps the most important, is the
development of Tokyo into an international financial
centre. Marunouchi/Otemachi, Tokyo's traditional
banking and central business center, the equivalent of
3
Wall street, has an office vacancy rate of zero.
Mitsubishi Estate, the largest landowner in the central
area which owns 60 per cent of the prime buildings in
2
Marunouchi has received applications for 181,000 m of
office space in Marunouchi and the three neighboring
districts of Otemachi, Yurakucho and Hibiya. About
half of the applications are filed by foreign companies
which have come to Tokyo to participate in the
2
SmithCharles. Boom in Prices Ends As Market
Enters a Lull, Far Eastern Economic Review, 12 March
1987, p. 47.
3
Strong Demand for Space, South China Morning
Post (Business Post), 11 November 1986, p. 7 and p. 9.
2
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development of an international financial centre.
Another factor which pushes up the demand for
office space and subsequently rental values is the
latest trend of office automation. The installation of
various kinds of office machines increases the amount
of floor space per worker needed.
The third factor is the further centralization of
offices in Tokyo. About 500 companies have switched
their headquarters to Tokyo recently. The average
2
office rent in Tokyo is now Y7,900 per m per month
which is more than double that of the third largest
2
city, Osaka, where average office rent is Y3,944 per m
per month.
Singapore
The office rents of Singapore have been kept at a
relatively low level due to the increase in the supply
of office space and the decrease in the demand as a
result of economic decline. According to Richard
Ellis, the international property consultant, 19% of
office space in Singapore's central area was vacant at
2
the end of 1986 and rentals fell 29% to S$40.80 per m
4
in the year to November 1986. Most office buildings
Holloway, Nigel. Hotels Price War Worrying
Result of Property Glut, Far Eastern Economic Review,
12 March 1987, p. 45.
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in Singapore are equipped with modern facilities such
as air conditioning, elevators, etc. Specialized
telephone and telex equipment can be obtained by having
an approval from the corresponding government
departments.
Therefore, Tokyo's rental costs are very much in
excess those of Singapore and Hong Kong. And rents in
Hong Kong are in turn lower than those of Singapore.
9.2 Human Resources and Wages
Hong Kong
Concerning human resources, Hong Kong has
sufficient personnel to make itself a major world
banking centre. Besides international bankers, Hong
Kong also possesses a great number of international
lawyers and auditors. Currently, Hong Kong's post-
secondary education is expanding at a fast pace to
nrovide a stronger work-force for the local community.
Tokyo
Japan's unemployment rate in January, 1987 was 3
per cent, the highest since Japan began compiling
unemployment figures in 1953. Also, because the
Japanese government has made heavy investments in
education, most workers have attained a relatively high
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level of education and it is not difficult for banks to
recruit personnel to run their daily operations.
However, the wage rates of Japan are relatively high.
The average monthly cash earnings of regular male
workers in the finance and insurance industries was
Y546,766 (US$3,609) in 1984.5 The high wages of Japan
has always been a chronic problem for foreign
companies. For instance, it is not unusual to find
that most London brokers are spending 200-300,000
pounds a year to keep a single analyst or dealer on the
ground in Tokyo.6 The costs of keeping a senior
analyst or institutional sales executive for a bank in
Tokyo is three times that of Hong Kong, according to
another source.7 Therefore, the high wage rates of
Japanese workers are a definite disadvantage for Tokyo.
Singapore
Singapore had a labour force of 1.204.000 in 1985
In the 1980 Census, there was only 2.7 per cent or
44.002 of the population aged 10 or above having
5 Economic Foreign Affairs Research Association.
Statistical Survey of Japan's Economy 1985F Japan:
Economic Foreign Affairs Research Association, 1985?
p. 61.
6 "And Now The Security Goes, Far Easterm Economic
Review, 20 November 1986, p. 92.
A Hard Market to Crack, South China Morning
Post (Business Post), 20 June 1986, p. 6.
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received a tertiary education,8 But this number has
increased tremendously. In the year 1985 alone,
tertiary education institutions had provided education
to nearly 40,000 students. This is a relatively high
figure among developing countries. However, it is
reported that there is a shortage of experienced
banking staff in Singapore and foreign banks may have
to send the local staff overseas for training.
Moreover, the foreign banks have had to use more
expatriate staff than they wished.9
In Singapore, the weighted average of the weekly
earning per employee in the financial and business
services industry is S$348.24 (US$155.49). The average
monthly income of the persons engaged in the financial
and business sector is S$1392.96 (US$649.82). On top
of that the employers and employees have to contribute
10 per cent of their salaries to the state controlled
Central Provident Fund. That means, the employers have
to bear a further 10 per cent of the staff cost. Thus
the average monthly cost of an employee for a bank is
S$1532.26 (US$714.80). The wage rates of Singapore are
relatively high in comparison with other countries of
Department of Statistics. Census of Population
1980, Singapore, Release No.3, Singapore: Department of
Statistics, March 1981, p.. 6.
9 Peat, Marwick, Mitchell Co. Banking in
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Weighted average of weekly earnings as at
August 1985= SS348.24
Source: Department of Statistics. Yearbook of
Statistics: Singapore, 1985/86, Singapore: Department
of Statistics, 1986.
metal not eual to 100.0 due to rounding.
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the region. That is because the Singapore government
had deliberately pursued a high wage strategy in order
to push the economy toward producing high
value/knowledge intensive products and to encourage the
development of services, banking and financial
industries in particular. Having been struck by
economic decline, the Singapore government wants to
stabilize wage rates at competitive levels. Therefore,
in July 1985, the National Wage Council (a tripartite
body of the government, employers and trade unions)
recommended an increase of wages from 3 to 7 per cent,
the lowest since 1972. And from April 1, 1986, the
contribution by both employers and employees to the
Central Provident Fund was decreased from 15 per cent
(the highest was 25 per cent) of the salaries to 10 per
cent.
Therefore, the high wages of Tokyo is a negative
factor for it to develop into an international banking
centre. The relics of the high wage policy of
Singapore will put her into a more disadvantageous
position than that of Hong Kong.
9.3 Communications
Hong Kong
Hong Kong is equipped with first-ckass
fPlecommunication and transportation facilities, and is
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now the second largest container port in the world,
second only to Rotterdam-
Tokyc
Tokyo has a very good communications system. On
the side of air transport, Japan Air Lines (JAL)
operates routes to various parts of the world. One of
the major airports of Japan, Narita, is established in
Tokyo. Moreover, the telecommunication system is
sufficient to connect Tokyo with almost every large
city in the world.
Internally, there were 31.1 million household
telephone subscribers and 13.7 million business
subscribers in 1985. There are also about 125 daily
newspapers and well over 2,000 weekly and monthly
10
magazines. Therefore, there is no problem of
communications between Tokyo with areas both inside and
outside Japan. This helps Tokyo to further its
development toward the direction of becoming an
international banking centre.
Singapore
Singapore has an excellent international
10 The Economist Intelligence Unit. Country
Profile: Japan 1986-87, The Economist Intelligence
Unit. September 1986, p. 24.
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communications system. She has close links with
Malaysia and Indonesia and is regarded to be the
regional hub. Singapore has a ultramodern
international airport at Changi with two runways and a
massive terminal. A second airport will be added to the
existing one in 1989. Some 43 airlines have flights
carrying passengers to and from Singapore on a regular
basis.
On the side of telecommunications, Singapore has a
system that is equipped with the latest technology.
Two antennae at the Sentosa Earth station provide
Singapore with direct access to over 50 countries via
INTELSAT's Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean satellites.
International telephone services enable the user to
access 207 destinations in various parts of the world
and 155 of them can be connected by International
11
Direct Dialling (IDD).
Internally, roads connected to different parts of
Singapore together with 500,000 vehicles dominate the
land transport system. In 1988, the first stage of the
Mass Rapid Transit system, a subway system, will be
completed and will constitute a new and important
element in land transport.
11 Information Division, Ministry of Communications
and Information. Singapore 1986, Singapore: Information
Division, Ministry of Communications and Information,
1986, pp. 123-124.
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With such a sophisticated communication system
both internally and externally, Singapore has the
advantage for developing into an international banking
centre.
In short, the three cities have more or less the
same kind of good international communications network.
9.4 Language
Hong Kong
English, the language of international commerce
and finance, is the official language, and is widely
spoken and understood by the local population of Hong
Kong.
Tokyo
Although English is taught in the secondary
schools and universities, the percentage of the
Japanese population who master this international
language is still very low. Therefore, if the
foreigners take the trouble to learn Japanese, this
will certainly help them to gain a deeper penetration
of the Japanese market. The learning of the oriental
language not only strengthens the communications
between the foreigners and Japanese, it can also serve
as a means to prove to their clients their long term
commitment to the Japanese market. However, it will be
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a slow process for the foreigners to master Japanese
and/or the Japanese to master English. The
unfamiliarity of English by most of the people in Japan
is a hindrance for Tokyo to further its development
towards becoming an international banking centre.
Singapore
English is one of the four official languages in
Singapore, (the other three being Malay, Chinese and
Tamil) and is also the language of administration. As
Singapore is a multi-racial society, there has to be a
common language that links up various ethnic groups.
The Singapore government thus emphasizes the learning
of English and the individual's mother tongue in its
education policy. As a result, 86 per cent of the
population are literate and 55 per cent of them are
fluent in both written and spoken English. Moreover,
the 1980 Census showed that 37.5 per cent of the
population were literate in two or more official
12
languages. As English is an international language
in the business sector, the high literacy rate in
English provides an additional advantage for Singapore
to develop into an international banking centre.
1L Department of Statistics. Census of Population
1980 Singapore, Release No. 3, Singapore: Department
of Statistics, march 1981, pp. 51-52.
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Because most of the Japanese population do not
master English, Tokyo is suffering from this language
problem, and this may pose a hindrance to its
development into an international banking centre.
9.5 Taxation
Hong Kong
Hong Kong has a low and simple tax system to
attract foreign investment. All corporations carrying
out business in Hong Kong, including local and foreign
banks, are liable to pay a profit tax, excluding all
dividend income, arising in or derived from operations
in Hong Kong. The present rate of the profit tax is 18
per cent for corporations, which is quite low as
compared to Japan and Singapore. Moreover, the
personal tax rate has been cut from 17 per cent to 16.5
per cent for the current fiscal year.
Tokyo
Because the Japanese government wants to develop
its offshore market, the 20 per cent withholding tax on
interest income applied to all domestic transactions
has been withdrawn. However, the offshore
participants still have to pay a 13 per cent local tax
and 43 per cent corporate tax. Many foreigners have
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been complaining about Japan's high tax rate. The
Financial Markets Committee of the Institute of Foreign
Bankers recommended that the offshore participants be
exempted from paying local and inhabitancy taxes. The
tax rate of Japan's offshore market is much higher than
that of Singapore and Hong Kong and is 40 to 50 per
13
cent higher than that of London and New York.
Therefore, unless Japan makes substantive tax
concessions, instead of a mere waiver of the
withholding tax, Hong Kong and Singapore will continue
14
to be the booking centre for offshore business.
Singapore
Any income that is derived from or accrued in
Singapore or received in Singapore from outside
Singapore is taxable. The tax rate starting from the
Year of Assessment 1987 has dropped to 33 per cent from
a previous 40 per cent. Except for minor differences,
the calculation of tax is the same for both domestic
and foreign institutions.
Because the Singapore government wants to promote
the offshore market, offshore income derived from the
operations of an ACU is taxed at a reduced rate of 10
13 Test of Maturity, Asiabanking, November 1986,
pp. 10-11-.
14 A Hard Market To Crack, South China Morning
Post (Business Post), 20 June 1986, p. 6.
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per cent. Therefore ACUs must have their own books of
accounts separated from the mother institutions.
The tax rate of Hong Kong is the most lenient
among the three cities. Comparing Singapore with





Current Profile of the Industry
The banking business in Hong Kong has always been
known to be very competitive. An obvious indication of
the level of activities is the number of banks. There
were 74 banks in the territory in 1977, while at the
end of 1986 the number of banks had increased to 151.
The following table gives a classification of the
licensed banks in Hong Kong for the past three years.
Of the 151 bank licenses in operation at the end
of 1986, more than three quarters (116) were held by
foreign-incorporated concerns. Adding locally
incorporated banks with foreign ownership or




LICENSED BANKS IN HONG KONG
BY PLACE OF INCORPORATION
1986 1985 1984
Local 35 35 35
PRC 9 9 9
UK 8 8 8
Us 2119 21






Source: Foreign Banks beat quiet retreat, South
China Morning Post (Business Post), 31 December 1986,
p. 3.
The immediate worries of the banking industry are
the continuing slack loan demand, and the lack of end-
investors in the capital market. The banking industry
is moving away from lending as a primary source of
income to fee generating services. Several banks have
set up their own private banking divisions.
Locally Incorporated Banks
Due to the growing importance of electronic
banking and the heavy investment involved, smaller
local banks have found it very hard to achieve growth.
The recent securitisation of debts worldwide has
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exerted additional pressure, forcing them either to
look for stronger partners or to voluntarily shrink
their operations. With weak managements and the
supervisory, framework, more and more small banks have
recently found themselves in difficulties. In fact, a
significant segment of the local banking structure has
been brought down either by fraud or mismanagement,
rather than by competition. In the recent past, seven
local banks, of various sizes, have had to be rescued.
No fewer than six of these were due to fraudulent
activities. At least four others have fallen into the
foreign ownership for other reasons. In 1985, Hong
Kong's locally incorporated banks incurred an
unprecedented aggregate loss of $773 million after a
1
series of collapse of rescues.
By the end of 1986, only seven out of the 35
licenses for locally incorporated banks were still held
by independent groups. Of the rest, 15 were foreign
owned or controlled and three others were held by
groups with foreign equity participation. Three were
owned by the Government as a result of recent bank
rescues, three were held by unincorporated
partnerships, and the remaining four belonged to the
Hong Kong Bank group.
1
Banks suffered $773m loss in wake of OTB
crash, South China Morning Post (Business Post),
2 January 1987, p. 1.0
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TABLE 7
DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL ASSETS AND DEPOSIT
OF LICENSED BANKS INCORPORATED IN HONG KONGa
Number of banks
Total Assets 1986 1985
($ million)
l0,000 and over 6 4
5,000- 9,999 10 6
2,000- 4,999 9 15










Source: Local banks polarise into weak and
strong South China Morning Post (Business Post),
2 March 1987, p.2
a Including three unincorporated banks.
95
Table 7 shows the distribution of total assets and
deposit of licensed banks incorporated in Hong Kong.
All indications suggest that the nine with the smallest
deposit bases were the same banks in both years. This
indicates that the smallest banks, mostly owned by
independent groups, have failed to show any significant
growth during the banking crisis of recent years. And
neither did the bottom end of the local banking sector
see much change in its total assets in 1986.
The deposit and asset growth of those banks at the
upper end of the scale is believed to be partly
attributable to foreign equity participation and
Government ownership.
Among the locally incorporated banks, the Hong
Kong Bank group still maintains its strength and
continues its international expansion. It is the
territory's largest bank.
Foreign Banks in Hong Kong
The foreign banks in Hong Kong can be broadly
classified into four major categories, namely Japan,
Europe, United States and China, i.e. by the
country/region where they were incorporated. The
following table will show'the total assets and deposits
of banks/DTCs under this classification.
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TABLE 8
TOTAL ASSETS AND DEPOSITS OF BANKS/DTCs
BY COUNTRY/REGION
Total assets (HK$m)
Country/region. 1985 1986 change
Japan 560, 365 980,496 75
Europe 294,489 369,469 25.4








Source: China-related banks boost local market
share, South China Moring Post (Business Post),
20 March 1987, p. 1
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China-related banks
China-related banks, apart from increasing their
market share, are showing greater sophistication in
their Hong Kong operations. Their number increased from
2
13 to 15 in 1986, while the number of China-owned DTCs
rose from 14 to 17.
China-related banks accounted for 18 per cent of
total deposits taken by all authorised institutions in
Hong Kong last year, compared with 15 per cent a year
3
earlier.
As seen from the Table 8, total deposits of China-
related banks jumped 51 per cent to HK$101.847 billion
from HK$67.4 billion during the same period, and their
total assets rose 41.5 per cent to HK$155.532 billion,
from HK$109.902 billion. The growth in deposits of
China-related banks far exceeded that of any other
group of foreign banks in the territory. Total assets
also went up 41.5 per cent to 155.5 billion.
2`Numbers different from that of Table 6 since
China-related banks included both China incorporated
banks and local incorporated banks that is owned by
China.
3 China-related banks boost local market share,
South China Morning Post (Business Post),
20 March 1987, p. 1.
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Two vital factors that strengthen their position
in the territory are political changes leading to Hong
Kong becoming part of China and the increasing momentum
of China's modernisation drive, which boosts Hong
Kong's role in channelling development funds there.
Moreover, structural changes in the local banking scene
over the past few years, as mentioned in the section
concerning the local incorporated banks, benefit the
China-related banks as they have a higher
creditworthiness to accept deposits.
Japanese banks
In 1986, the number of Japanese banks in Hong Kong
increased from 20 to 25, making Japan the largest
foreign bank contingent in the local market. In
addition, there are 34 DTCs and 13 representative
offices of Japanese origin in Hong Kong.
Deposits of Japanese banks fell 20.5 per cent,
while their total assets show an increase of 75 per
cent last year. Though Japanese institutions remain net
borrowers in the Hong Kong money markets, the size of
their operations has soared.
The rapid establishment of Japanese banks in Hong
Kong is due to the fact that these banks are using Hong
Kong as a springboard into China, and to a lesser
extent, into South East Asia. Japanese bankers regard




Banks and other financial institutions from the
United States have also seen their business grow,
although their number contracted from 24 to 22 in 1986.
In addition, DTCs dropped from 39 to 35 and
representative offices decreased from 19 to 18,.
Besides the decrease in the number of US banks,
there were several American banks that had reduced
their local operations. To quote a few examples, The
Bank of America closed eight of its 11 local branches
and dismissed 160 employees in 1986. In April 1986,
Citibank shifted its regional office for investment
banking to Tokyo. The First National Bank of Chicago
also trimmed its occupancy in the Connaught Centre by
25 per cent in 1986.
Despite their reduced presence, US banks as a
whole saw modest growth in their business in Hong Kong.
Total deposits increased by 13.9 per cent to HK$62.8
billion (from HK$55,.1 billion in 1985), while total
assets were up 11. 7 percent to HK$198,. 6 billion (from
HK$177-.7 billion) They also became net lenders of
HK$3.3 billion, having been net borrowers of HK$15,.1
billion.
Although somewhat handicapped by their relatively
smaller branch networks than the large local banks,
they remain highly competitive through focused
marketing, product innovation and strong international
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service capabilities. In addition, related financial
services such as credit cards, travellers checks and
investment services have gained them access to up-scale
consumers, which are the US banks' priority market.
They are also very active in the Hong Kong Interbank
and Asia-Pacific Forex markets and other merchant
banking activities.
European banks
European banks show steady growth in the local
markets. Their number of local licenses rose from 35 to
37 last year. The number of European DTCs was up to 54,
from 52, and representative offices to 62, from 57.
The total deposits of European banks in Hong Kong
grew 36.3 per cent last year to HK$99.2 billion (from
HK$72.7 billion). Total assets rose 25.4 per cent to
HK$369.5 billion (from HK$294.5 billion). In the local
money market, European banks became net lenders of
HK$16.6 billion last year, after being net borrowers of
HK$12.3 billion in 1985.
Four Australian banks obtained licenses to operate
locally last year. This was the first time that
Australian banks were present in Hong Kong. In March
1987, two Italian banks, namely the Cassa di Risparmio
delle Provincie Lombarde and the Banco di Napoli, and
another Japanese regional bank, the Bank of Fukuoka,
were granted permission to open branches in Hong Kong,
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bringing the number of licensed banks in the territory
4
to 154. Besides showing a sign of foreign confidence
in Hong Kong, their actions also strengthen Hong Kong's
position as the major banking centre in Asia.
10.2 Tokyo
Although banks in Japan are highly specialized in
a particular kind of business, competition is extremely
intensive. This is partly a consequence of the recent
deregulation which intensifies the competition among
different kinds of banks in certain banking businesses.
Moreover, the massive inflow of foreign banks into the
Japanese market also brings in new ideas that force
local banks to sharpen their services to their clients.
In March 1965, there were only 15 foreign banks
operating in Japan the number increased sharply to 77
at the end of 1985. Almost all of them began their
business in Tokyo. Their entries have already
stimulated a lot of changes in the banking sector. For
instance, the trust banks and life insurance companies
which run most of the Japanese pension funds are forced
to improve their reporting. In the past, Japanese fund
sponsors would accept reports that provided simply a
single number representing the cash basis performance
4
Three foreign banks licensed.. South China
Mornincl Post (Business Post), 27 March 1987, p,. 8.
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of the portfolio in the latest year. However, the
western rivals are prepared to give much more detailed
information on their fund's investments, according to
Mr. Chris Nowakowski, President of the Connecticut-
5
based performance measurement firm, Intersec. The
pitfall of such kind of single-figure reports is that
they ignore all unrealized gains and losses, and the
results may be misleading.
Foreign banks are attracted to Japan as a direct
result of the rapid economic progress of this country.
They think that it is here where big businesses start
and that it is a land full of promise. For many of
them, their results so far probably do not match their
expectations. The reports of the Institute of Foreign
Bankers, which was formed in late 1984 and has 33
member banks (representing almost half of the foreign
banking community), may well demonstrate this point. As
a group, their recurring profits in 1984 (ending March
1985) dropped more than 30 per cent, while net profits
fell 40 per cent. Twenty-six of them suffered net
losses in that year. Some of them including Grindlays,
Midland and American Express, have already closed their
Japanese establishments and gone home. Why are the
foreign banks, which are equipped with sophisticated
banking techniques abandoning a market that is full of
5 Full of Western Promise, Euromoney, March 1986,
p. 73.
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opportunities and promise? The answer may be divided
into two parts- keen competition among foreign banks
and the Japanese ways of doing business.
As most foreign banks are new to the market, they
do not have a large network of connections. Therefore,
all of them strive to make appointments with the senior
staff of large companies. Toshiba's general manager in
the international finance division, Mr. Nobuyuki
Horiuchi, said, My first impression when I came into
this job last year was of how many guests from foreign
banks and securities companies we received every day.
We think competition in the electronics business is
tough- but it's nothing compared to the financial
6
service industry. Even if the newcomers are awarded
an interview to sell their services to their potential
Japanese clients, they have only one chance- they will
not have any business relationship with their potential
clients if they cannot impress the Japanese firms
during that appointment. The profit margins are deeply
cut into as so many foreign banks are striving to share
this oriental pie. To make the situations even worse,
Japanese have far less need to borrow money than they
used to as they have been very successful in
accumulating cash. Foreign banks which specialize in
6 How to Impress a Japanese Firm, Euromoney, July
1986, p-. 169-.
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the traditional lending and borrowing business will no
longer be that attractive to the Japanese businessmen.
To sadden the newcoming foreign banks, many
Japanese firms are responding to them very slowly. Mr.
Chishiro Tsuneoka, senior assistant to the chief
financial officer, said that even if a foreign bank was
very keen and appealing to them, they still needed
three to five years to evaluate them. Many Japanese
companies prefer to have relationships with a limited
number of banks only and the newcomers will
automatically be put into a less advantageous position.
There are several recent trends that may cheer up
the foreign banks. The younger Japanese generation who
have been deeply influenced by western culture is now
moving up to the top management positions. They are
more educated with an international view. it is highly
possible that they are more ready to build up business
relationships with foreign banks. In fact, some of the
top officials of the large companies have acknowledged
the contributions of foreign banks. Mr. Toshiyuki
Kozeki, deputy general manager for finance at Japan Air
Lines commented that foreign banks were very innovative
and new instruments that foreign banks bring in, such
as swaps, had changed-the Japanese market. Likewise,
Mr. Kiichiro Aiura, president of Mitsui OSK, also
praised the foreigners for giving quicker responses and
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providing more detailed information.
Second, many Japanese companies are planning to
acquire companies in North America and Europe in order
to open up new opportunities. There is a great demand
for merger and acquisition advice, as Mr-. Neil
Benedict, vice president in charge of corporate finance
at Salomon Brothers Asia, forecasted. Foreign banks
can fill in this market niche.
Although the foreign banks can make important
contributions to the development of Tokyo into an
international banking centre, the local banks cannot be
ignored. The financial strengths of the Japanese city
banks are comparable to any large banks in the world.
There was only one Japanese bank, Dai-Ichi Kangyo in
the Euromoney's top ten ranking banks in terms of
assets in 1983. Four others- Fuji Bank, Sumitomo,
Mitsubishi and Sanwa, had already been listed in the
top 10 in 1985. Due to the appreciation of the yen,
possibly eight of the top ten were Japanese banks in
8
1986.
Japanese banks are extending their operations
internationally. Many of them have set up branches or
representative offices in London and New York. In the
I How to Impress a Japanese Firm, Euromoney, July
1986g, p.. 169-.
8 An Exciting Market- For Tough Players Onlly6,..
Euromoney (Special Sponsored Supplement), August 1986,
p-. 2
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Asian region, we can also see the important presence of
Japanese Banks in Singapore and Hong Kong. For
instance, Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank purchased Chekiang First
Bank of Hong Kong for about Y10 billion (US$61 million)
in 1986. As these overseas branches will definitely
maintain a close link with their headquarters in Japan,
mostly in Tokyo, they will serve to deepen Tokyo's
status as an international banking centre.
Moreover, Japan is now the largest exporter of
capital nowadays. By the end of 1985, the net external
assets of Japan amounted to US$129.8 billion while
Britain, the next largest creditor nation, was US$90
9
billion. It is likely that there will be increasing
amounts of capital raised in Japan. For instance, in
1986, a New Zealand company borrowed US$150 million in
Japan. One point to note is that although the financing
was arranged in Tokyo, many of the Japanese banks
booked their contributions in Hong Kong or Singapore.
Such arrangements were mainly to take advantage of the
10
relatively low tax rates of Hong Kong and Singapore.
9Capital Floods In And Pours Out, Euromoney
(Special Sponsored Supplement), August 1986, p. 14.
10
Search of Pastures New, Asiabanking,
December 1986, p.. 40-.
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Offshore Banking Market
Tokyo's offshore banking market was officially
declared to function on 1 December 1986. The nature of
the Tokyo offshore market is basically like that of
Singapore. In Singapore, the ACUs are the main vehicle
for the offshore banking business. In Tokyo, to
participate in offshore banking, banks have to apply
for offshore licences. There are already 181 banks who
have applied for it, but many of them are not active
participants. The advantage of offshore banking is that
banks are exempted from the withholding tax derived
from incomes on transactions between non-residents.
However, banks still have to pay the corporation and
local taxes. Such separation between onshore and
offshore banking is only necessary for countries where
banking regulations are tight. In Hong Kong, where
there is no control on transactions for either
residents or non-residents, the offshore market is
simply the onshore transactions between non-residents.
The Tokyo offshore market had assets of US$97 billion
in December 1986 and is estimated to have passed US$110
billion in January. The figures for Singapore and Hong
Kong are US$155 billion and US$143 billion in December
1985 respectively. Therefore, the Tokyo market is
below that of Singapore and Hong Kong but is ready to
catch up. If we compare that to the offshore market of
New York when it was one month old in December 1981, it
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was US$46 billion, which was well behind that of
11
Japan.
The opening of the Tokyo offshore market did not
derive the anticipated enthusiasm. There are basically
three reasons for this. First, the big Japanese banks
do not see it as a great opportunity for them as they
can do most of the transactions that the offshore
market offers through their overseas branches. It is
only the small regional banks with no overseas
establishments that really need such a market.
Second, the regulation of the offshore market is
still considered to be tight. For instance, securities
deals are not allowed to be carried out in the market.
Moreover, many bankers are of the opinion that the tax
concession is not great enough for them. Mr. Yusuke,
chairman of Bank of Tokyo, is lobbying for further tax
and regulatory concessions.
Third, the additional paperwork required to
separate the onshore and offshore accounts has already
disappointed many bankers.
With greater deregulation in the future, the Tokyo
offshore market may be boosted and will challenge the
existing ones of Hong Kong and Singapore. Nevertheless,
the opening of the offshore market will bring an
additional advantage to Tokyo.
11Japan's Offshore Barriers, The Economist,
21 February 1987, p-. 73-.
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10.3 Singapore
To become an international banking centre, more
foreign banks have to be attracted in order to carry
out more international banking activities. However,
the situation is not too optimistic f or Singapore.
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell Co-. has compiled a report
concerning foreign financial institutions in
12
Singapore. The survey covered 21 of the 24 full
license foreign banks, 12 of the 14 restricted license
foreign banks, 66 of the 79 offshore foreign banks and
50 of the 54 foreign merchant banks. The results for
the full licence and restricted license banks are
disappointing. Net profits for the full license banks
dropped from S$272.5 million to S$38 million in 1985.
The corresponding figures for restricted license banks
are S$35.2 million and negative S$38.1 million
respectively. However, the offshore and merchant
banks' performance have been improving. Net profits for
the offshore banks increased from S$153-.3 million in
1984 to S$210.9 million in 1985. Merchant banks were
also able to improve their net profits from S$203.6
million in 1984 to S$212.1 million in 1985.
The disappointing performance of some of these
fnreicn banks brought about some harmful effects to
12 Foreign Banks: Sink or Swim, AsiabanKing,
December 1986.
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Singapore's economy. For instance, there was a net loss
of 3,500 jobs in the financial and business services
sector in 19851, and the first half of 1986 also saw a
further loss of 1,200 jobs according to the Ministry of
Labor figures. Some foreign banks downgraded or even
closed their operations in Singapore. There are
several factors that contribute to this phenomenon.
First, the demand for syndicated lending to
countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and the
Philippines, which was bread and butter business for
some banks, has declined. This in turn is due to the
economic downturn of the whole region, the availability
of new alternatives for financing and the contraction
of ship financing, which was once one of the main
streams of business for many banks.
The economic recession in Singapore and Malaysia
put many companies into difficulties. Many banks
suffered heavy losses as a result of the collapse of
the Pan-Electric group which once built a business
empire in the South East Asian Region. The banks
suffered further losses when the stockbroking firms
which were heavily exposed to contracts involving the
shares of Pan-Electric and its affiliated companies
become insolvent.
The collapse of Singapore's property market is
another reason for the disappointing performances of
the banks which are heavily involved in local lendings.
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At the same time, banks are facing new challenges
in Singapore. New financial services and markets are
being developed. One example is the growth of financial
futures trading on the Singapore International Monetary
Exchange (SIMEX). Another is the development of new
forms of trade financing such as forfaiting. Singapore
is also becoming a regional countertrade services
centre.
New business can also be found in the bond market.
The Singapore government has launched reconstituted
government bonds with the hope that it can stimulate
the development of an active corporate securitised debt
market-.
Other new debt instruments are also developing in
Singapore. One obvious example is the Revolving
Underwriting Facilities (RUFs).
Therefore, there is a demand for a wider range of
financial services in the banking sector of Singapore.
If the banks can overcome all these challenges by
devising new services to their clients, the challenges
may turn into opportunities.
Based on the present performance of the banking
sector alone, the outlook for Singapore to further her
development in international banking business is
gloomy.
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10.4 Competitive Profiles of the Three Cities
The banking sectors of Singapore and Tokyo are
highly unfavourable for foreign banks as many of them
are suffering from net losses. Conditions in Tokyo
have been improving and may benefit the community of
foreign banks. There are new challenges to the banking
sector of Singapore. The future of the banking
community will depend on how well the banks can adapt
to the new situations.
In Hong Kong, the performances of the banks have
been varied. Many locally incorporated banks had been
purchased by or amalgamated with foreign organisations.
Some of the foreign banks, especially the Japanese
ones, are expanding their presence in the Territory as
they regard Hong Kong to be a springboard to Mainland
China's market. Other banks such as the U.S. ones are
contracting their Hong Kong operations. The situations




In the long run, we have to accept the fact that
Tokyo will become the major banking centre in the Asian
region. The chief reason is that the economies of Hong
Kong and Singapore are dwarfed by that of Japan. In
addition, Tokyo also benefits from a relatively stable
political environment, an excellent communications
network, a strategic time zone location which is
complementary to those of London and New York, the
gradual deregulation of the financial sector, and the
expansion of the Japanese banks.
However, the pace of Tokyo's emergence as the
leading banking centre in Asia will be very slow. For
reasons that were mentioned in earlier chapters,
Japan's deregulation is expected to move slowly. The
high costs, high tax rates, highly regulated legal
system, unsympathetic commercial customs to the
foreigners, the language problem and the highly
competitive business environments will further hinder
the development of Tokyo as an international banking
centre. As exemplified by the statistics? Japan only
has 77 foreign commercial banks, which is lagging
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behind Hong Kong's 116 and Singapore's 117. Singapore
and Hong Kong's offshore markets are still leading that
of Tokyo in terms of assets. Therefore the
international banking business will not be one-sidedly
in favor of Tokyo in the near future.
Although the emergence of Tokyo will certainly
pose a strong challenge to the present position of Hong
Kong, there is still an important role that Hong Kong
can play in the banking business of the region. The
major advantage that Hong Kong has is its affinity to
the market of Mainland China. With the progress of
economic modernization in China, there is a strong
demand for foreign capital. Hong Kong is the most
suitable place to bridge the gap between China and the
outside world. The upsurge of China-related banking
business may more than compensate for the declines due
to the competition from Tokyo.
Other than having a strong relationship with
China, Hong Kong's laissez-faire philosophy, reflected
in the lax banking rules and low tax rates, will
maintain Hong Kong's competitive edge. Hong Kong can
therefore act as a booking centre for syndicated
lendings in the region.
On top of that, Hong Kong's good infrastructure,
the presence of international financial and legal
expertise, the relatively low rental and staffing costs
and the prevalence of English-speaking personnel will
work to resist Tokyo's invasion. At least in the short
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run, Hong Kong will not be an absolute loser in the
battle against Tokyo.
The freedom from exchange control and a set of
modest or even low tax rates in Singapore will maintain
Singapore's role as a major trading centre for the US
dollar in Asia in the short run.
In the long run, the outlook for Singapore is not
optimistic. Unlike Hong Kong, Singapore does not have
such a large market as China to compensate for the
competition from Tokyo and the decreasing demand for
capital in the neighboring countries. The most
important long run advantage that Singapore enjoys is
that she does not have a 1997 problem. This is
especially important in the long run as any
international banking centre must be free from major
political stress. However, even if Hong Kong suffers
from the problem of having an unclear political
condition, it is still uncertain whether the major
beneficiary will be Tokyo or Singapore.
The hope of Singapore will lie in the hands of her
government. The Singapore government's policy of
developing the country's financial industries may bring
about some revolutionary changes that will serve to
undermine the excessive control of the MAS on the
banking sector.
The best situation the three cities can hope for
is that the emergence of Tokyo will boost the banking
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businesses to the whole Asian region. Instead of
competing for a larger slice of a cake, the three
cities may strive for a larger cake. In such case,
Tokyo will stand out as a major banking centre in the
world alongside with London and New York. Then Hong
Kong and Singapore will play complementary roles to




OF THE HONG KONG BANKING ORDINANCE
(1) Introduction
The capital adequacy ratio is intended to act as a
control over the employment of the funds by an
authorized institution incorporated in Hong Kong. The
capital adequacy ratio requirement is set out in Part
XVII of the Banking ordinance and is not expected to
become effective until lst September, 1988. The ratio
is calculated by expressing the capital base as a
percentage of risk assets, which terms are defined in
the Third Schedule of the Ordinance.
Broadly, capital base includes shareholders'
funds and any perpetual subordinated debt listed in the
Fifth Schedule, from which are deducted investments in
the authorized institution's subsidiary and holding
companies, certain financial exposure to connected
companies and intangible assets, risk assets include
all assets and contingent liabilities which are each
given a risk weight 'of 0-.0, 0.2, 0.5, 10 or 1.0,
depending on the nature of the item. The risk weight of




Every authorized institution incorporated in Hong
Kong is required to maintain at all times a capital
adequacy ratio of 5 per cent. The Commissioner may
raise the ratio for a particular institution to 8 per
cent in the case of a bank and 10 per cent in the case
of a DTC-. A contravention of the ratio will not in
itself be an offence. However, failure to report the
contravention or to take remedial action as required by
the Commissioner will constitute an offence.
At present, all authorized institutions
incorporated in Hong Kong are requested to provide the
relevant information in the monthly returns. It is
understood that the Commissioner will be examining such
information with a view to resolving any potential





OF THE HONG KONG BANKING ORDINANCE
(1) Introduction
The separate requirements regarding the holding of
specified liquid assets by authorized institutions
(i-.e. banks and DTCs) were discarded and replaced by a
new liquidity ratio requirement which is set out in
Part XVII of the Banking Ordinance and which applies to
all authorized institutions. The ratio is calculated as
the ratio between liquefiable assets and qualifying
liabilities, which terms are defined in the Fourth
Schedule of the Ordinance.
(2) Requirement
Every authorized institution is required to
maintain a liquidity ratio of not less than 25 per cent
in each calendar month, calculated on the basis of the
sum of its liquefiable assets and the sum of its
qualifying liabilities of each day of the month
concerned. However, the Commissioner may give the
institution written authorization to calculate its
liquidity ratio by reference to such days during the
calendar month as the Commissioner may specify, which
is normally on a weekly basis. The Commissioner may
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also vary the ratio as he sees fit, by increasing or
decreasing the ratio, in relation to any institution.
It will not be a contravention if the liquidity
ratio of an authorized institution falls below 25 per
cent on a particular day. It is the ratio for the
calendar month that will be used as the yardstick for
determining whether the requirement has been
contravened. A contravention of the ratio will not in
itself be an offence. However, failure to report the
contravention or to carry out remedial action as




(a) net one-month liabilities due from relevant banks
(b) currency notes and coins
(c) loan repayments by instalment due within one
month
(d) the net realizable amount within one month of:
(i) export bills maturing within six months or
payable after sights
(ii) securities issued, guaranteed or indemnified
by approved governments
(iii) other bills, certificates, notes, paper or
debts securities which are negotiable and have a






(a) net one-month liabilities due to relevant banks
and
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